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Bad Judges
Geoffrey P. Miller1
In jurisdictions across the country, complaints are heard about judges and
magistrates who are incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, or corrupt.2 These bad judges
terrorize courtrooms, impair the functioning of the legal system, and undermine public 
confidence in the law.  They should not be allowed in office.  Yet many retain prestigious 
positions even after their shortcomings are brought to light.  The situation, moreover, 
does not appear to be under control.  If recent scandals in New York3 and other states4 are 
a guide, incidents of judicial misconduct may be on the rise. 5
The problem of bad judges is embedded in broader considerations about the 
optimal design of the judiciary in American political culture.  The basic tradeoff is 
between independence, accountability and quality.  To preserve independence it is 
necessary to insulate judges from external controls over their behavior.  If judges are 
protected from external controls, however, they have fewer incentives to provide quality
services.  To ensure accountability judges must be subject to democratic processes.  But 
influence and patronage, enemies of good judging, are inevitable when judges are chosen
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2by political means.  The challenge is to select, retain, supervise and remove judges in 
such as way as to maintain independence and accountability while not unduly sacrificing 
quality.6
The policy space is already populated with approaches to this challenge.  Several 
of these ideas make eminent sense.  However, the common element of most is that they 
rely on public processes.7  This paper explores a different reform, not inconsistent with 
governmental responses, but based principally on the actions of private parties.  The idea 
has two parts.  First, litigants would be presented with a randomly selected panel of trial 
judges and permitted as of right to exclude one or more in such a way that the judges 
being excluded are shielded from knowledge about the litigants’ choices.8  Second, 
statistics on exclusion rates would be compiled and used to aid in the process of retention, 
supervision and removal.  
This paper is structured as follows.  Part I describes activities that mark a jurist as 
a bad judge.  Part II addresses the fundamental policy tradeoff.  Part III discusses existing 
approaches to the problem.  Part IV sets forth and analyzes the judicial exclusion 
proposal.
I.  Bad Judges: Types and Examples
Ideally, the mix of public policies employed to combat bad judges should take 
account of the full range of activities that impair the quality of justice in America ’s 
6 Independence, accountability and quality are themselves instrumental in the basic design problem 
for republican government, namely how to minimize the sum of the costs of governmental and private 
violence, expropriation and abuse.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 
Social Philosophy & Policy 196 (1991) (identifying this optimization problem as the fundamental challenge 
of a republican form of government).
7 The most salient exception that relies on private initiative, peremptory challenges of judges, is 
discussed at text accompanying notes __ - __ infra.
3courtrooms.9  It turns out that most examples of bad judging can be grouped into the 
following categories: (1) corrupt influence on judicial action; (2) questionable fiduciary 
appointments; (3) abuse of office for personal gain; ( 4) incompetence and neglect of 
duties; (5) overstepping of authority; (6) interpersonal abuse; (7) bias, prejudice and 
insensitivity; (8) personal misconduct reflecting adversely on fitness for office; (9) 
conflict of interest; (10) inappropriate behavior in a judicial capacity; (11) lack of candor; 
and (12) electioneering and purchase of office.10
Corrupt Influence on Judicial Action.  Most famously, bad judges corrupt the 
administration of justice.  They tip suspects about search warrants,11 hinder execution of 
arrest warrants,12 block charges13 and reduce bail. 14 They overlook requirements for 
8 As discussed below, the idea is similar to procedures used in some contexts to select arbitrators, 
and also has a relationship to rights of peremptory challenge of judges that already exist in some states. See
text accompanying notes __, ___ infra.
9 In addition to decisions by state and federal courts, information on bad judges can be obtained 
from state judicial disciplinary commissions, newspapers, and scholarly books and papers.  The discussion 
that follows draws on all of these sources.
10 These categories overlap in some respects the definitions contained in state codes of judicial 
ethics, nearly all of which are based on the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1990).  The categories 
used here they appear to provide a useful means for analyzing judicial misconduct along functional lines.
11 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary 
Law in Relation to Kenneth W. Gibbons , a Justice of the Glenville Town Court, Schenectady County, New 
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 6, 2002, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/gibbons.htm (judge alerted an attorney that he had signed a 
warrant to search client’s premises).  
12 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary 
Law in Relation to Thomas S. Kolbert, a Justice of the Cheektowaga Town Court, Erie County, New York 
State Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 26, 2002, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/K/kolbert.htm (as a favor to a friend, judge attempted to 
dissuade police from executing an arrest warrant).
13 See, e.g., Miss. High Court Orders Judge Reprimanded, Baton Rouge Advocate, October 12, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 3872539 (judge allegedly prevented police from filing domestic abuse charges 
against judge’s client).
14 See, e.g., Christopher Tritto, Ex-court Marshal Receives Probation, Community Service, 
Charleston Gazette & Daily Mail, March 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5452448 (magistrate collected 
money from criminal defendants as a price for releasing them on bond); Richard Marosi, State Agency 
Admonishes Former Judge, Los Angeles Times, October 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25903584 (judge 
improperly reduced bail for criminal suspects at request of a friend ).
4changes in legal status,15 fix parking tickets,16 dismiss moving violations,17 “take care” of 
DUI cases,18 issue corrupt rulings in civil19 and criminal20 matters, and grant special 
access privileges to lawyers with pending cases.21 If a matter is not before them, they
commandeer it,22 misappropriate the file,23 direct the case to a friendly judge24 or lobby
the judge to whom the matter is assigned.25 They even alter outcomes by tampering 
with26 or fabricating27 official records.
15 See John Greiner, Judges Can Face Ouster from Bench, Daily Oklahoman, December 30, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 103885756 (Oklahoma judge pocketed fees for waiving age and blood test 
requirements for obtaining a marriage license).
16 See San Jose State Agency Investigates Judge’s Ethics on Tickets, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 
2003, available at 2003 WL 2401698 (judge accused of fixing parking tickets); Wren Propp, Court 
Suspends Mora Magistrate, Albuquerque Journal, April 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 18623941 (same); 
Shannon Lafferty, Danser Defends Handling of DUI Case: New Questions For South Bay Judge Who Tried 
to Dismiss Parking Tickets, San Francisco Recorder, February 11, 2003 (same).
17 See Inquiry Concerning Judge Michael E. Platt, California Commission on Judicial Performance, 
August 5, 2002, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/Platt%208-5-02.rtf (speeding 
tickets); Commission on Judicial Performance v. Gunn, 614 So.2d 387 (Miss. 1993) (same).
18 See Commission on Judicial Performance v. Jones, 735 So.2d 385 (Miss. 1999) (judge illegally 
reduced DUI charge to disorderly conduct);  John Sullivan, Durham Judge’s Censure Sought, Raleigh 
News & Observer, January 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3909876 (judge disposed of DUI case in a back 
hallway of the courthouse ).
19 See In the Matter of James Funke, Jr., 757 N.E.2d 1013 (Ind. 2001) (judge issued protective 
orders in favor of relatives challenging decision of water and sewer district);  A Judge Judged: Jaffe’s Plea 
Shouldn’t Be The End of the Story, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
3888717 (judge extorted $13,000 from a lawyer with a promise of favorable treatment).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996) 
(judge took bribe to acquit mob hit man in murder case); John Caniglia, Probe Drags Mahoning Courts to a 
New Low, Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5171084 (judge took a $500 
bribe to fix a criminal case); In re Honorable Phil Shoffner, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability 
Commission, November 19, 2002, available at  http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/112102_shoffner.pdf (judge 
heard his own son’s criminal case); In the Matter of Skinner, 690 N.W.2d 484 (N.Y. 1997) (judge 
summarily dismissed criminal case against a friend).
21 See A Judge Judged: Jaffe’s Plea Shouldn’t Be The End of the Story, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
February 13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3888717 (judge promised special access to attorneys in exchange 
for bribe).
22 See, e.g., In re Joseph A. Condon, No. 77 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge non-suited traffic tickets that were not assigned to him).
23 Carri Geer Thevenot, Judicial Commission: Complaint Resolved by Apology, Las Vegas Review-
Journal, February 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 6871391 (judge kept the court file of his own child’s 
case).
24 See Brian Anderson, Hyde Misconduct Hearing Ends, Contra Costa Times, March 28, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 17139683 (judge helped obtain a favorable judge for his daughter’s case).
25 See, e.g., In re Honorable Frances-Ann Fine, No. 9501-222, Nevada Commission on Judicial 
Discipline, October 1998, available at http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/finefindings98.htm (judge spoke with 
fellow judges about a divorce case in which the judge had an interest and, while attending hearing as a 
spectator, made faces in an attempt to influence the outcome); Commission on Judicial Performance v. 
5Bad judges get various rewards for influencing cases: goods,28 sex,29 debt relief,30
cash,31 or the satisfaction of helping out family,32 friends,33 lovers,34 employees,35 elected 
Chinn, 611 So.2d 849 (Miss. 1992) (judge asked a fellow judge to give “consideration” to particular 
defendants); Inquiry Concerning Judge Michael E. Platt, California Commission on Judicial Performance, 
August 5, 2002, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/Platt%208-5-02.rtf (judge intervened 
in friend’s daughter’s theft case);  In re Honorable John Schatz, Jr., California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, December 15, 1989, available at 
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Schatz_PubR_121589.doc (judge intervened in son’s drug case); In re 
Judge Glenda K. Doan, California Commission on Judicial Performance, August 13, 1990, available at 
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Doan_Pubr_081390.doc (as a favor to a friend, judge called another 
judge and probation department officials to recommend release of criminal suspect); In re Harry R. 
Buoscio and Paul Sheridan, No. 97 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge discussed an overweight truck citation with judge to whom 
case had been assigned).
26 See Inquiry Concerning Johnson, 692 So. 2d 168 (Florida 1997) (judge backdated DUI 
convictions); Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law, Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 12685479 (judge altered city manager’s name, birth date and social security 
number on court records to cover up a drunk driving arrest).
27 See In the Matter of Joseph G. Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 1998) (judge created false divorce 
decree).
28 Brendan Smith, Cases Cover a Wide Range, Albuquerque Journal, February 11, 2002, available at 
2002 WL 12685560 (magistrate resolved a complaint against a trucker for an overweight load by taking 
100 pounds of timber for personal use).
29 See In the Matter of Edwards, 694 N.W.2d 701 (Indiana 1998) (judge presided over or attempted 
to influence cases involving parties with whom judge was having sexual relations); Brendan Smith, 
Espanola Group’s Deposits Queried, Albuquerque Journal, September 27, 2003, available at 2002 WL 
100703036 (judge pressured a female defendant for a date); Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the 
Law, Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002 (judge asked criminal defendant and domestic abuse victim 
for dates); David Rosenzweig, Former Judge Sentenced for Sex With Defendant, Los Angeles Times, 
February 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2457658 (judge had affair with wife of a criminal defendant 
awaiting sentencing before him).
30 See Inquiry Concerning Judge Michael E. Platt, California Commission on Judicial Performance, 
No. 162, August 5, 2002, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/Platt%208-5-02.rtf (judge 
fixed a ticket at the request of the wife of a man to whom the judge had owed money).  
31 E.g., Tom Perrotta, Trouble in Brooklyn Spurs Court Reforms: Oversight Added for Matrimonial 
Matters, New York Law Journal, April 28, 2003 (judge solicited $100,000 in bribes); Robert Becker, 
Convicted Judge Seeks $113,222: Shields Contends State Owes Pension Payout, Chicago Tribune, April 
26, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 3659810 (judge found guilty of taking $6,000 in bribes); Mark 
Gillispie, 3 More Officials Face Charges: Corruption of Judiciary Probe Continues, Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
October 26, 1999, at 3B, available at 1999 WL 2388782 (attorney pleaded guilty to paying bribes to 
judges).
32 See In the Matter of James Funke, Jr., 757 N.E.2d 1013 (Ind. 2001) (father, aunt and cousin);   
Brian Anderson, Hyde Misconduct Hearing Ends, Contra Costa Times, March 28, 2003, available at 2003 
WL 17139683 (daughter); Court Reprimands Judge Robert Brown, Florida Bar News, November 1, 1999 
(son).
33 See Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (friend); In 
the Matter of Skinner, 91 N.Y.2d 142, 690 N.E.2d 484, 667 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1997)(friend); Brian Anderson, 
Hyde Misconduct Hearing Ends, Contra Costa Times, March 28, 2003, available at 2003 WL 17139683 
(friend’s daughter); Richard Marosi, State Agency Admonishes Former Judge, Los Angeles Times, October 
4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25903584 (friend and friend’s daughter); Inquiry Concerning Former Judge 
Arthur S. Block, December 9, 2002, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Block%20Decision%2012-09-02.rtf. (friend’s daughter).
6officials36 and colleagues.37 Judges also accept gratuities.  Although gifts may not 
themselves constitute bribery or extortion, they smack of impropriety when offered by 
lawyers38 or litigants.39
Judges who corruptly influence outcomes frequently act as sole proprietors.  But 
malfeasance can become systematic.  The FBI’s Operation Greylord investigation 
revealed pervasive corruption in Cook County Illinois courts during the 1980s.40 Fifteen 
judges and attorneys in the Youngstown Ohio area were convicted of federal crimes 
between 1997 and 2000.41  A Washington Post exposé published in 2000 detailed 
pervasive misconduct in the Hillsborough County Florida court system.42 Most recently, 
34 In re Jett, 882 P.2d 426 (Arizona 1994) (judge released paramour from jail).
35 See, e.g., Doan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 902 P.2d 272 (California 1995) (judge 
presided over felony case against former gardener); Matter of Ross, 1990 Ann Rep 153 (New York 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, Sept 29, 1989) (judge failed to disqualify himself in matters involving 
business clients, tenant, and personal attorney); Matter of Barker, 1999 Ann Rep 77 (New York 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, March 17, 1998) (judge failed to disqualify himself in a small claims 
case involving a party who had recently done work for the judge similar to that at issue in the case).  
36 See In the Matter of Eplin, 416 S.E.2d 248 (West Virginia 1992) (state senator).
37 See, e.g., Public Admonishment of Judge B.J. Bjork, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, n.d., available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/BjorkPA_051595.rtf (judge gave lenient 
treatment to family member of fellow judge at colleague’s request).
38 See, e.g., Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 897 P.2d 544 (California 1995) (judge 
received services from lawyer who had won a substantial settlement in a case before him); Paula 
McMahon, Judge Faces Reprimand for Taking Tickets, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, May 5, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 5657245 (baseball tickets).
39 See, e.g., In re Daghir, 657 A.2d 1032 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 1996) (tickets to college football game); 
In re James E. Murphy, No. 87 CC-5, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (free rental cars); In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 
97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980) (gifts from rental car company).
40 See, e.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (in petition for habeas corpus relief, party 
convicted of capital murder held entitled to discovery into potential bias of Cook County trial judge who 
had himself been convicted of taking bribes from criminal defendants); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 
645 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996) (“yet another in an unfortunately long line of public 
corruption cases which have left a blot on the escutcheon of Chicago justice”); Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces 
of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 Denver University Law Review 1231 (1997) (describing 
author’s confrontation with corrupt Cook County judge).
41 See John Caniglia, Probe Drags Mahoning Courts to a New Low, Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 
18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5171084 (several defense attorneys, four municipal court judges, and a 
former county prosecutor were convicted of various crimes ).
42 See Fawn Germer, Intrigue, Investigations Embroil a Courthouse; From Public Defender to Chief
Judge, Allegations Seem Epidemic in Florida’s Hillsborough County, Washington Post, August 9, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 19623310.  See also  Ken Koehn, Courthouse Only Looks Silly, Insiders Maintain, 
7widespread malfeasance has come to light in Brooklyn New York.43  One Brooklyn 
justice was convicted of soliciting bribes and sentenced to prison;44 another was charged 
with rigging a divorce.45  At least fourteen Brooklyn judges have recently faced ethical or 
criminal investigations,46 and a district attorney is looking into still more allegations.47
Questionable Fiduciary Appointments.  A particularly rich source of benefits for 
bad judges is the power to appoint friends and allies as criminal defense counsel,48 court 
evaluators,49 guardians,50 receivers,51 trustees, mediators,52 referees,53 special counsel,54
or special masters.  In Brooklyn New York, party leaders and politically connected law 
Tampa Tribune, August 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24594017 (presenting insiders’ defense of the court 
system).
43 See generally Alexandra Marks, In Brooklyn, Fixing a ‘Corrupt’ Court System ; Series of Judicial-
Bribery Scandals May Lead to Changes in Way Judges Are Selected, Christian Science Monitor, August 
12, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5254871 (describing Brooklyn scandal and analyzing its implications for 
reform nationwide).
44 See Tom Perrotta, Trouble in Brooklyn Spurs Court Reforms: Oversight Added for Matrimonial 
Matters, New York Law Journal, April 28, 2003 (Supreme Court Justice Victor I. Barron sentenced to 
prison for soliciting bribes). 
45 See Alexandra Marks, In Brooklyn, Fixing a ‘Corrupt’ Court System; Series of Judicial-Bribery 
Scandals May Lead to Changes in Way Judges Are Selected, Christian Science Monitor, August 12, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 5254871 (indictment of Judge Garson).
46 Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7, 2003, p. 4.
47 Tom Hays, Corruption Scandal Shakes Brooklyn Court, Associated Press Online, August 4, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 60552348 (District Attorney reportedly conducting a grand jury investigation into the 
relationships between Brooklyn judges, politicians and lawyers).
48 See In re Chrzanowski, 636 N.W.2d 758 (Michigan 2001) (judge appointed her paramour to 
represent indigent criminal defendants at state expense without disclosing the relationship to opposing 
counsel). 
49 See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm.
50 See John Council, E-mail Criticizes Judge’s Reprimand as “Unjustified” Texas Lawyer, February 
11, 2002 (judge awarded an ad litem appointment in a child custody case to an attorney who had 
represented the judge in a probate matter).
51 See Voting No on Elected Judges, New York Daily News, December 2, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 27989053 (judge appointed the law partner of the county Democratic leader as receiver of a local 
cemetery.)
52 In re Honorable Frances-Ann Fine, No. 9802-222, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, 
October 1998, available at http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/finefindings98.htm (judge appointed her cousin 
as mediator without disclosing the relationship, then threatened to hold the parties in contempt when the 
mediator was not paid).
53 See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm (mentioning referees as type of fiduciary 
appointment subject to abuse).
8firms have received hundreds of such appointments.55  Brooklyn judges also reward 
colleagues: one former judge received nearly 250 appointments while another collected
$424,000 for a guardianship conferred within three months of leaving office.56  Judges 
also use appointments to reward their campaign managers, coordinators, treasurers, and 
finance committee chairs.57
Abuse of Office for Personal Gain. Bad judges misuse their prestige58 and abuse 
their contempt,59 warrant,60 bail,61 sentencing,62 and inherent63 powers.  They do so in 
order to avoid legal process,64 punish enemies,65 pursue political ambitions,66 conduct
54 Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003, at 
(surrogate judge reportedly appointed a prominent Democrat to the lucrative position of counsel to the 
public administrator; the appointee then made the Democratic country party boss a partner in his law firm.)
55 See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm (providing details of investigation into 
such appointments).
56 See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm.
57 See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm.
58 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Judge D. Ronald Hyde, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, May 14, 1996, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HydeCNCN_05-14-96.rtf 
(complaint letters to airlines and book publisher on official letterhead); Public Admonishment of Judge 
Charles W. Stoll, California Commission on Judicial Performance, June 3, 1996, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/StollPA_06-03-96.rtf (letters to collection agency on official letterhead).
59 See Inquiry Concerning O’Neal, 454 S.E.2d 780 (Georgia 1995) (improper use of contempt 
power); Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct, Formal Ethics Opinion # 002, available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/CONDUCT.htm (judges who abuse the contempt power by jailing without basis 
or explanation violate code of judicial conduct); Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, 
Letter to Honorable Jack Lewis, Case No. 97-294, July 20, 1998, available at 
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Lewis97.294.PDF  (judge inappropriately convicted a person of 
contempt for posting materials on judge’s office door accusing the judge of misconduct).
60 See State Briefs, San Antonio Express-News, June 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27526998 
(judge signed warrant for arrest of a personal enemy).
61 State Briefs, San Antonio Express-News, June 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27526998 (judge 
set bail for wrongfully arrested attorney at $690,000).
62 See In re William D. Vanderwater, No. 76 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge sentenced his own former tenant to jail in connection with a 
personal dispute).
63 See, e.g., In re William G. Schwartz, No. 01 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge improperly barred individuals from the courtroom); Miss. 
High Court Orders Judge Reprimanded, Baton Rouge Advocate, October 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
3872539 (judge who represented a husband in a divorce allegedly used his office to obtain a criminal 
history of the ex-wife’s new husband). 
64 See, e.g., In re Edwin A. Gausselin, No. 99 CC-1 Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge informed police that he was a member of the judiciary after 
9business ventures67 and run personal errands.68 One Illinois judge managed to combine 
many of these misdeeds in a few hours: he “detained a former tenant with the aid of a 
being detained for driving under the influence); In re Cynthia Raccuglia, No. 99 CC-2 Illinois Judicial 
Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (same); In re John M. Karns, Jr., No. 80 
CC-4, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge destroyed 
records of his DUI arrest, thus avoiding prosecution); Debbie Rhyne, Dooly Judge Punished for Striking 
Deputy, Macon Telegraph, available at 2002 WL 23049756 (judge attempted to use his position to avoid a 
citation for violating traffic laws); Adriana Colindres, Change Meant to Improve Courts Commission;
Amendment Asks Illinois Voters to Add Non-Judge Members to Panel, Peoria Journal Star, available at 
1998 WL 5783398 (judge attempted to use his position to avoid citation for violating traffic laws); Linda 
Kleindienst, Florida Court Orders Reprimand for Judge, Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, June 2, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 22176766 (judge attempted to use his position to avoid a citation for soliciting 
prostitutes). 
65 See, e.g., In re William G. Schwartz, No. 01 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge allegedly pressured Southern Illinois University School of 
Law to admit his stepson, and when the application was denied, retaliated by banning students from the 
school’s clinic from representing clients in his court); Inquiry Concerning Gallagher, 951 P.2d 716 
(Oregon 1998) (judge used official letterhead in numerous disputes with third parties); William Young, 
Ousted Town Judge Can’t Practice for Three Years, New Jersey Lawyer, February 24, 2003 (judge 
allegedly demanded that the school district fire a teacher who had gotten into an argument with the judge’s 
son, and, when the district refused to comply, ordered the teacher arrested and presided over his 
arraignment); Brendan Smith, Cases Cover a Wide Range, Albuquerque Journal, February 11, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 12685560 (magistrate ordered the arrest of a former tenant who had damaged the 
floor of a building he owned, then set the bond so high that the tenant was forced to stay in jail until he 
agreed to pay for the repairs).
66 See In re Peck, 867 P.2d 853 (Arizona 1994) (judge reinstated charges brought by two allies 
against his electoral opponent); In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578 (Missouri 2000) (judge sat on the case of the 
daughter of a political rival); In re Randall S. Quindry, No. 74-CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Commission, 
available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge attempted to alter absentee ballots); Inquiry 
Concerning O’Neal, 454 S.E.2d 780 (Georgia 1995) (judge ordered arrest of entire County Board of 
Commissioners, which whom she was having a salary dispute); Inquiry Concerning Gallagher, 951 P.2d 
716 (Oregon 1998) (judge used official stationary to solicit campaign contributions); Gary Sprott, Corporal 
Wanted Transfer, Sheriff Says, Tampa Tribune, February 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5493834 (judge 
forced staff to work on his re-election campaign); Gwen Filosa, Judge Asks for 1-year Penalty, New 
Orleans Times-Picayune, June 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4014626 (judge directed his staff to sell 
tickets to political fundraisers); Tiffany Y. Latta, Charges Pending Against Judge; Allegations Include 
Sexual Harassment, Improper Solicitation of Campaign Funds, Columbus Dispatch, June 14, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 57336738 (judge hit up staff for campaign contributions); Judge Issues Regrets for 
Re-election Remarks, Raleigh News & Observer, December 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 29351535
(judge demanded campaign contributions from attorneys); Judicial Reform Needed Now, New Orleans 
Times-Picayune, May 25, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4010966 (judge reportedly coerced his staff to work 
on his reelection campaign).
67 See, e.g., Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct, Formal Ethics Opinion # 012, available at ., 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/CONDUCT.htm (use of official title and court system phone number to conduct 
personal business); Public Admonishment of Judge Robert C. Coates, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, April 12, 2000, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/CoatesPA_04-12-00.rtf 
(judge used official title in applying for loans and seeking better service from merchants); Inquiry 
Concerning Judge D. Ronald Hyde, California Commission on Judicial Performance, May 14, 1996, 
available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HydeCNCN_05-14-96.rtf (judge accessed DMV records to 
compile private mailing list); Inquiry Concerning Judge James Randal Ross, California Commission on 
Judicial Performance, April 30, 1998, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/RossCNCN_04-30-
98.rtf (judge sold copies of his book at the courthouse and promoted it to jurors); In the Matter of the 
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hand gun, had him arrested and charged with theft, procured a guilty plea and jury 
waiver, conducted a midnight proceeding in the police station and sentenced [him] to 8 
months in jail.”69
Bad judges also misappropriate public resources, dipping into the public till for 
personal expenditures,70 falsifying expense records for travel, meals and lodging, 71
facilitating bogus reimbursement requests by staff,72 misusing the franking privilege,73
and requiring criminal defendants to contribute to their pet charities in lieu of fines.74
They also waste public funds for unnecessary expenditures such as boondoggles to 
useless seminars.75
Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, December 
1995, available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (judge carried on an antiques business from 
the courthouse).
68 See Inquiry Concerning Campbell, 426 S.E.2d 552 (Georgia 1993) (chauffeur and translation 
services); In re Judge Judith Rogers, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission, March 22, 
2000, available at  http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/rogers.96.119.PDF (personal errands); Inquiry 
Concerning Judge D. Ronald Hyde, California Commission on Judicial Performance, May 14, 1996, 
available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HydeCNCN_05-14-96.rtf (babysitting); In the Matter of the 
Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, December 
1995, available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (chauffeur services).
69 In re William D. Vanderwater, No. 76 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm.
70 See Inquiry Concerning Campbell, 426 S.E.2d 552 (Georgia 1993) (judge removed more than 
$15,000 from the magistrate’s court); In the Matter of the Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107, 
Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, December 1995, available at 
http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (judge took petty cash advances from court register); Two 
Judges Face Censure for Judicial Misconduct, Salt Lake Tribune, January 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL 
3340968 (judge stole bail money to cover personal debts); Brendan Smith, Espanola Group’s Deposits 
Queried, Albuquerque Journal, September 27, 2003, available at 2002 WL 100703036 (judge allegedly 
deposited $19,000 of public funds into account of nonprofit group he controlled).
71 Tracy Dash, Wes Teel Continued His Duties, Court Told, Biloxi Sun Herald, February 21, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 11385779 (judges resigned in order to avoid prosecution for falsifying expense 
records).
72 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Honorable Raymond L. Kern, 774 N.E.2d 878 (Ind. 2002) (judge 
submitted false mileage claims for employees who had already been paid).
73 See In re Samual G. Harrod, III, No. 80 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge used official frank for self-promotional mailings).
74 See In the Matter of the Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107, Nevada Commission on 
Judicial Discipline, December 1995, available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (judge 
directed criminal defendants to contribute to designated charities in lieu of fines).
75 See In re Judge Pamela Taylor Johnson, 767 So.2d 2 (La. 2000) (refusing by 3-2 vote to 
discipline judge for authorizing court employees to attend seminars unrelated to their job functions).
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Incompetence and Neglect of Duties.  Bad judges may lack even slight command 
of the law.76 They confuse elementary burdens of proof and persuasion,77 misunderstand 
fundamental rights,78 rule prematurely,79 and generally display egregious ignorance of the 
rules that supposedly govern their decisions.  Bad judges procrastinate.80  Whether 
because of emotional problems81 or laziness,82 they fail to rule on motions, set cases for 
76 For an account claiming that incompetence is rampant in the New York State Supreme Court in 
Queens, see Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003. p. 3.
77 See In re Euguene R. Ward, No. 73 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge gave a judgment to a plaintiff who had presented no 
evidence); Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003. p. 3 
(judge forgot that the jury in a criminal case must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
78 See In re Hathaway, 630 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. 2001) (judge threatened to imprison criminal 
defendant if he did not waive jury trial); In the Matter of Honorable Douglas A. Cox, 680 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 
1997) (judge penalized a litigant for insisting on a jury trial); In the Matter of Vaughn, 462 S.E.2d 780 
(Georgia 1995) (judge forced defendant to enter guilty plea without counsel present); Inquiry Concerning 
Judge Howard R. Broadman, California Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 26, 1999, available at 
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/BroadmanPA_02-26-99.rtf (judge refused to allow a litigant to present 
evidence, testify under oath, and cross-examine witnesses); Stuart Pfeifer, Ex-Doctor’s Sexual Battery 
Conviction is Voided, Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2479320 (judge allowed 
defendant to be questioned under oath in front of the jury without counsel present); John Sullivan, Durham 
Judge’s Censure Sought, Raleigh News & Observer, January 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3909876 
(judge convicted a defendant of a crime with which he had not been charged).
79 See In re Judge W.Q. Hall, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission, November 22, 
1999, available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/hall_98-284.pdf (judge entered judgment even 
though neither party had appeared); In re Robert J. Sulski, No. 73-CC-4, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 
available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge convicted a defendant before the defense 
rested); Terry Dickson, Hammill Faces New Complaint, Florida Times-Union, October 19, 2001, available 
at 2001 WL 25999931 (judge ordered party to pay money without a hearing).
80 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Complaint Against Van Susteren, 118 Wis.2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 
(1984) (judge took eighteen years to resolve a probate matter); Doug Guthrie, Deal Allows Jelsema to 
Retire, Avoid Discipline, Grand Rapids Press, February 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4846457 (judge 
allowed a child support case to linger for more than a decade); In re Euguene R. Ward, No. 73 CC-1, 
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge entered judgment 
for a plaintiff in a case that had been settled).
81 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary 
Law, in Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (anxiety attacks); In the Matter of Carpenter, 
17 P.3d 91 (Ariz. 2001) (narcolepsy); Richard Winton, Los Angeles Panel Fires Judge Who Resigned, Los 
Angeles Times, May 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2486155 (phobia of the bench); Michael Rezendes, 
Conduct Ruling Delayed So Judge Could Retire, Boston Globe, July 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
3336538 (obsessive-compulsive disorder).
82 See Matter of The Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, Subdivision 4, of The Judiciary Law, In 
Relation To J. Kevin Mulroy, A Judge Of The County Court, Onondaga County, New York Law Journal, 
August 23, 1999 (judge pressured a prosecutor to offer a plea because the judge wanted to get home for 
“men’s night out”); Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591 (California 1990) 
(judge quit showing up for court prior to his retirement); Doan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 
902 P.2d 272 (California 1995) (judge was habitually 60 to 90 minutes late in commencing court sessions); 
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trial, or issue decisions.83 Poor administration can also be an issue.  Bad judges lose 
evidence,84 misplace files,85 mismanage staff,86 and fail to keep accounts of the court’s 
financial registry.87 They neglect official responsibilities by delegating them to law 
clerks,88 prosecutors,89 court clerks,90 and even law students91 and law professors!92
Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law, Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002, available at 
2002 WL 12685479 (judge showed up in court only two days a month, would not post a schedule, and was 
finally removed after failing to appear for four straight months).
83 See, e.g., In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dreyfus, 182 Wis.2d 121, 
513 N.W.2d 604 (1994) (judge failed to decide cases in a timely manner); In re Hathaway, 630 N.W.2d 
850 (Mich. 2001) (judge displayed an “overall lack of industry”); In re Honorable Thomas P. Breen, 
California Commission on Judicial Performance, February 28, 1995, available at
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Breen_PubR_022895.doc (judge found to have engaged in a 
continuing pattern of failing to dispose of judicial matters promptly and efficiently); In the Matter of 
Honorable William McKimm, Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, No. 97-284, 
available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/mckimm_97-284_final.pdf (judge failed to handle 
cases in timely fashion); Voting No on Elected Judges, New York Daily News, December 2, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 27989053 (study of justices and surrogates in state courts in New York City 
concluded that “[n]early one in five missed more than two months of work, 48 failed to meet efficiency 
targets, one in 10 failed to begin an adequate number of trials and one in 10 did not dispose of an adequate 
number of cases”).
84 See Gwen Filosa, Money Sets Judicial Rivals Apart; Former Prosecutors Vie for Vacated Seat, 
New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 29, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25262865 (trial judge removed 
from office after failing to preserve at least a dozen trial transcripts).
85 See Wren Propp, Court Suspends Mora Magistrate, Albuquerque Journal, April 10, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 18623941 (county magistrate’s office lost paperwork and mishandled court files).
86 See In re Judge Sharon K. Hunter, 823 So.2d 325 (La. 2002) (judge failed to supervise court 
reporters and other administrative personnel); In the Matter of the Complaint Against Van Susteren, 118 
Wis.2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984) (judge failed to supervise court personnel for prompt and efficient 
disposition of official business).
87 See Boggan v. Judicial Inquiry Commission, 759 So.2d 550 (Alabama 1999) (judge found to have 
presented fraudulent deposit slip to auditors of court registry accounts).
88 See Ann W. O’Neill, Appeals Court Criticizes L.A. Judge for ‘Egregious’ Misconduct, Los 
Angeles Times, May 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2244483 (judge allowed his law clerk to preside over 
a pre-trial conference).
89 See Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge 
delegated part of the sentencing function to prosecutor).
90 See In re Inquiry Concerning R.R. Seal, 585 So.2d 741 (Miss. 1991) (judge allowed clerical 
personnel to adjudicate criminal cases); Mississippi Judicial Performance Commission v. Hopkins, 690 
So.2d 857 (Miss. 1991) (judge allowed court clerks to dismiss parking tickets); In re Eugene R. Ward, No. 
79 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge 
permitted court clerk to conduct court calls and enter orders).
91 See Janan Hanna, Outspoken Judge Will Take Class to Curb Anger, Chicago Tribune, May 9, 
2002 (judge allowed visiting high school students to question an expert witness during a trial).
92 See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tesmer, 219 Wis.2d 708, 580 
N.W.2d 307 (1998) (judge allowed a law professor to draft judicial opinions).   
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Overstepping Authority.  Bad judges disregard of the limits of their authority.93
Acting as quasi-vigilantes,94 they engage in personal investigations of alleged 
wrongdoing,95 summarily try defendants without allowing them to prepare a defense,96
sentence them to jail before  conviction,97 force cases to trial for inappropriate reasons,98
become personally involved with litigants,99 order witnesses arrested,100 and engage in
improper ex parte contacts with parties101 and witnesses.102  Misuse of the contempt 
power is common.  Bad judges inappropriately hold people in contempt for offenses such 
93 As the Supreme Court of Florida described one such judge, “Graham made what he perceived to 
be a valiant effort at ridding Citrus County of . . . political favoritism and government corruption . . . . His 
zealous pursuit of a pure society apparently clouded his ability to impartially adjudicate the matters before 
him. His motives are acceptable, but his methods are not.”  Inquiry Concerning Graham, 620 So.2d 1273 
(Fla. 1993).
94 One judge chased a couple in his own car when he observed their vehicle being operated in a 
reckless manner, then forced them to appear before him in an “unofficial” hearing in order to teach them a 
lesson.  True Tragedy: Judge’s Loss Should be Retold Accurately, Columbus Dispatch, September 21, 
1999, available at 1999 WL 27421423.
95 See Cheryl Reid, Tollefson, Stolz Say They Offer Clear Choice, Tacoma News Tribune, October 
12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5339113 (judge launched his own investigation of a child custody case).
96 See In re Judge Preston Aucoin, 767 So.2d 30 (La. 2000) (judge censured for practice of ordering 
“instanter trials” immediately after defendants pleaded not guilty at arraignment).
97 See Inquiry Concerning Fred L. Heene, Jr., October 13, 1999, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HeeneCNCN_10-13-99.rtf (judge summarily 
jailed a defendant for failing to complete community service obligation).
98 See Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7, 2003 (judge 
pushed a case to trial because he “felt it was necessary for the therapy” of the victim to “tell her story” in 
order to “reach closure”).
99 See Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge 
encouraged a defendant in a family law matter to attend a religious men’s fellowship meeting at the judge’s 
house where the defendant’s personal problems became a focus for discussion);Arkansas Judicial 
Discipline and Disability Commission, Press Release, November 24, 1998, available at 
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/mckimswin.pdf (judge drove a juvenile he had sentenced to a detention 
center, and when the center refused to accept the boy, took him to a gambling casino). 
100 See Inquiry Concerning Fred L. Heene, Jr., October 13, 1999, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HeeneCNCN_10-13-99.rtf (judge summarily 
ordered arrest of  complaining witness in a rape case after she admitted giving a false statement to the 
police).
101 Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge engaged 
in persistent ex parte contacts with parties).
102 In re Honorable Frances-Ann Fine, No. 9802-222, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, 
October 1998, available at http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/finefindings98.htm (family court judge 
persistently spoke ex parte with therapists and family services personnel in attempts to resolve matters 
pending before her).
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as whispering,103 napping,104 tardiness,105 truancy,106 sassiness,107 and wearing annoying 
tee shirts.108 Judges find people in contempt of court in absentia109 or when court is not 
in session.110 They deny people the opportunity to respond to citations for contempt,111
summarily ban people from their courtrooms,112 and intimidate people by threats of 
contempt.113
Interpersonal Abuse at the Workplace.  Bad judges abuse nearly everyone in their 
professional environment: attorneys,114 law clerks,115 secretaries,116 court reporters,117
103 See Inquiry Concerning Judge William M. Ormsby, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, March 20, 1996, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/OrmsbyCNCN_03-20-96.rtf. 
(judge ordered summary arrest of spectators and parties for whispering in court).
104 See Inquiry Concerning Judge William M. Ormsby, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, March 20, 1996, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/OrmsbyCNCN_03-20-96.rtf
(judge summarily ordered party into custody for appearing to fall asleep in court).
105 See Inquiry Concerning Fred L. Heene, Jr., October 13, 1999, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HeeneCNCN_10-13-99.rtf (judge summarily 
declared juror in contempt for being late to court).
106 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Honorable Donald C. Johnson, 658 N.E.2d 589 (Ind. 1995) (judge 
ordered arrest of attorney who did not appear in court, then held summary contempt hearing in presence of 
attorney’s client with attorney dressed in prison garb).
107 See, e.g., In re Glynn J. Elliott, Jr., No. 89 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge verbally abused a high school student who was a spectator at 
a hearing, had him summarily handcuffed to a chair, berated him again, and again ordered him handcuffed).
108 See In re Dexter A. Knowlton, No. 78 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge sanctioned spectator for wearing tee shirt saying “bitch bitch 
bitch” ).
109 See, e.g., Public Admonishment of Judge Lisa Guy-Schall, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, October 14, 1999, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/Guy-SchallPA_10-14-
99.rtf (judge sentenced a party not present in court to five days in jail for contempt).
110 See Commission on Judicial Performance v. Chinn, 611 So.2d 849 (Miss. 1992) (judge held a 
highway patrolman in contempt when court was not in session).
111 See, e.g., Public Admonishment of Judge Lisa Guy-Schall, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, October 14, 1999, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/Guy-SchallPA_10-14-
99.rtf (judge failed to allow a party the opportunity to respond to citation for contempt).
112 In re Keith E. Campbell, No. 79 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge expelled two reporters from the courtroom when one began 
sketching a witness, then locked the doors to the courtroom for the remainder of the trial).
113 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Judge James Randal Ross, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, April 30, 1998, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/RossCNCN_04-30-98.rtf 
(without proper cause, judge declared “if he says one more word even under his breath in this courtroom I 
will hold him in contempt of court and you will take him to the Orange County jail”).
114 See, e.g., In re Elliston, 789 S.W.2d 469 (Missouri 199) (sixteen attorneys testified to their 
personal experiences with abusive judge); Inquiry Concerning Judge Bruce Van Voorhis, California 
Commission on Judicial Performance, February 27, 2003, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/Van%20Voorhis%202-27-03.rtf (judge denigrated an attorney’s 
competence in open court and conducted mocking colloquy with the jury present); In the Matter of the 
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clerical staff,118 litigants,119 fact witnesses,120 expert witnesses,121 jurors,122 law 
professors,123 law students,124 spectators,125 reporters,126 and other judges.127 In the worst 
Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in Relation to Ira J. Raab, New 
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 3, 2003, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/R/raab.htm (judge displayed persistent pattern of abuse towards 
attorneys);  Tom Bailey Jr., ‘New’ McCalla Debuts as Jocular, Lawyer-Friendly, Memphis Commercial 
Appeal, September 17, 2002, available at 2002 WL 24948083 (describing abusive judge’s attempt at 
rehabilitation); Judge’s Penalty is Appropriate, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, April 12, 2003, available at 
2003 WL 16669207 (judge belittled attorneys who appeared before him, threw tantrums, and exhibited 
intemperate and unreasonable behavior); Ralph Ranalli, Lopez Resigns, Denies Misdeeds; Says Accepting 
Findings Goes Against Principles, Boston Globe, May 20, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3397208 (judge was 
persistently rude, hasty, discourteous, sarcastic, and condescending towards prosecutors).
115 See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law, in 
Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (judge became abusive towards law clerk after 
termination of romantic relationship between them).
116 See, e.g., In the Matter of McClain, 662 N.E.2d 935 (Ind.1996) (judge sent vulgar letters to 
secretary employed at the courthouse and enclosed a used condom); Voting No on Elected Judges, New 
York Daily News, December 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27989053 (judge made offensive sexual 
comments to his secretary).
117 See Timothy R. Brown, Increasing Number of Judges Being Judged in Miss. Courts, Baton Rouge 
Advocate, January 3, 2002 (judge accused of beating his own court reporter).
118 See Transfer Puts Judge in Concord, Contra Costa Times, October 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
100622730 (judge sanctioned for abusing staff); Scott Sandlin, Metro Judge’s Suspension Upheld, 
Albuquerque Journal, December 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31469050 (judge charged with being 
threatening and abusive to court staff); Miss. High Court Orders Judge Reprimanded, Baton Rouge 
Advocate, October 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3872539 (judge accused of verbally abusing court 
clerks and other county employees); Cheryl Reid, Tollefson, Stolz Say They Offer Clear Choice, Tacoma 
News Tribune, October 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5339113 (judge chased court employees down a 
hallway in a rage).
119 See, e.g., Robynn Tysver, Omaha Judge Reprimanded for Mistreating Defendants, Omaha World-
Herald, September 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4374792 (judge routinely yelled at and berated 
defendants who appeared before him).
120 See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Ralph
G. Gorenstein, 174 Wis.2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989) (judge criticized witness for crying on the stand).
121 See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Ralph
G.Gorenstein, 174 Wis.2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989) (judge made denigrating remarks about facility 
with which expert witnesses were associated); Ann W. O’Neill, Appeals Court Criticizes L.A. Judge for 
‘Egregious’ Misconduct, Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2244483 (judge 
engaged in demeaning questioning of expert witness).
122 Transfer Puts Judge in Concord, Contra Costa Times, October 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
100622730 (judge found to have mistreated jurors).
123 See In re Alan R. Schwartz, 755 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2000) (judge made sarcastic remarks about law 
professor who was appearing in court and denigrated textbook she had written).
124 See In re Alan R. Schwartz, 755 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2000) (judge threatened to sanction legal clinic 
student and then walked out before she completed her argument).
125 Miss. Panel Seeks Ouster of Judge for Misconduct, Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 17, 
1998, available at 1998 WL 21183913 (judge allegedly had spectator arrested for leaning sideways on a 
bench, then ordered a body cavity search).
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cases, the animosity boils over into assaults.128  Judges are also accused of sexually 
harassing a virtual census of courthouse workers: prosecutors,129 public defenders,130
probation officers,131 court reporters,132 caseworkers,133 bailiffs,134 administrative 
clerks,135 interns,136 secretaries, 137 other employees,138 journalists,139 law clerks,140 and 
even fellow judges.141
126 Miss. Panel Seeks Ouster of Judge for Misconduct, Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 17, 
1998, available at 1998 WL 21183913 (judge ordered reporter arrested for publishing juvenile arrest 
record).
127 See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Robert Crawford, 
629 N.W.2d 1 (Wisconsin 2001) (judge threatened to publicize purported evidence of misconduct by chief 
judge); Inquiry Regarding Jose Angel Velasquez, California Commission on Judicial Performance, April 
16, 1997, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/VelasquezCNCN_04-16-97.rtf (judge made public 
statements disparaging fellow judges);  Joe Gyan Jr., Judge Receives 30-day Suspension, Baton Rouge 
Advocate, November 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3876933 (judge cursed at two fellow judges); In re 
Jones, 581 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 1998) (judge said “fuck you” to fellow judge and called her a “bitch”).
128 See, e.g., Commission on Judicial Performance v. Guest, 717 So.2d 325 (Mississippi 1998) 
(assault on a litigant); Joe Gyan Jr., Judge Receives 30-day Suspension, Baton Rouge Advocate, November 
29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3876933 (assault on judge).
129 See In re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge 
commented on breasts of prosecuting attorney and told another prosecutor that he wanted to “jump your 
bones”); Robert Becker, State Ousts Judge, Cites Harassment, Chicago Tribune, December 4, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 30798221 (judge sexually harassed four female prosecutors).
130 See In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980)
(secretary at public defender’s office).
131 See In re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge harassed 
county district court probation personnel); In re Richard D. Cicchetti, 743 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2000) (judge 
harassed female probation officer).
132 See In re Richard D. Cicchetti, 743 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2000) (judge made repeated unwanted phone 
calls to court reporter and asked her for dates).
133 See In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980)
(judge sexually harassed employee of private social services agency).
134 See Inquiry Concerning Judge W. Jackson Willoughby, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, June 27, 2000, available at  http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/WilloughbyCNCN_06-27-
00.rtf (judge engaged in improper and unwanted touching of bailiff’s breasts). 
135 See Inquiry Concerning Judge W. Jackson Willoughby, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, June 27, 2000, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/WilloughbyCNCN_06-27-00.rtf
(judge made kissing gestures towards his administrative clerk and told her he wanted her to “sit there and 
look pretty”); Wren Propp, Court Suspends Mora Magistrate, Albuquerque Journal, April 10, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 18623941 (county magistrate accused of sexually harassing administrative clerk); In 
re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge sexually harassed docket 
clerk).
136 In re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge sexually
harassed law student intern).
137 See Tiffany Y. Latta, Charges Pending Against Judge, Columbus Dispatch, June 14, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 57336738 (judge charged with sexually harassing secretary).
138 See Christopher Goffard, Memos in Harassment Case are Public, Court Rules, St. Petersburg 
Times, February 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12204666 (judicial assistants); Christine Mahr, Judge’s 
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Bias, Prejudice and Insensitivity.  Bad judges display bias, prejudice, and 
stereotypical thinking.  In criminal cases, they manifest prejudice against the 
prosecution142 and the accused.143 They display sexist attitudes against both women144
and men.145 They insult a melting pot of groups including African Americans,146
Hearing Canceled; Settlement Proposed, Desert Sun, October 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25960154
(court employee). 
139 See In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980)
(judge behaved in sexually aggressive manner towards journalism student).
140 See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law, in 
Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (judge harassed law clerk after termination of 
romantic relationship between them).
141 See, e.g., Fawn Germer, Intrigue, Investigations Embroil a Courthouse; From Public Defender to 
Chief Judge, Allegations Seem Epidemic in Florida’s Hillsborough County, Washington Post, August 9,
2000, available at 2000 WL 19623310 (judge sent email to fellow jurist suggesting liaison).
142 See, e.g., In re Duckman, 677 N.Y.S.2d 248, 92 N.Y.2d 141, 699 P.2d 872 (1998) (judge 
improperly dismissed charges against criminal defendants and verbally humiliated prosecutors),  Ralph
Ranalli and Joanna Weiss, Friends Say Lopez Will Quit Bench, Boston Globe, May 15, 2003, available at 
2003 WL 3396366 (judge displayed bias against the prosecutors raising fundamental questions about her 
fitness to serve); Gwen Filosa, 2 Felons Sue Courts, New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 28, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 3995220 (judge allegedly improperly allowed more than a thousand suspects go free 
without posting bond); Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7, 
2003 (judge joked when a prosecutor collapsed with chest pains, telling him not to “take it so personally”) .
143 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary 
Law in Relation to Mark C. Dillon, a Justice of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 6, 2002 (judge gave a speech after jury verdict lambasting 
defense counsel); David Rosenzweig, Judge Removed From Case Over Remark, Los Angeles Times, 
March 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2469672 (judge questioned credibility of criminal defendants who 
testify in their own defense); John Caher, Agency’s Authority to Act Under ‘Spargo’ Clarified: 
Prosecutions for Behavior on the Bench May Proceed, New York Law Journal, April 22, 2003 (judge 
allegedly engaged in a persistent conduct of “denying rights to counsel, setting unreasonably high bail, 
coercing guilty pleas, [and] entering convictions against defendants who were not before him”); Janan 
Hanna, Outspoken Judge Will Take Class to Curb Anger, Chicago Tribune, May 9, 2002 (judge interrupted 
defense lawyer’s closing arguments 45 times and suggested that defense witnesses were thieves and drug 
addicts); Dennis Opatrny, More Than Half of S.F. Bench up for Re-Election, San Francisco Recorder, May 
8, 2001 (judge reassigned from criminal cases after being accused of bias by public defender’s office); Ann 
W. O’Neill, Appeals Court Criticizes L.A. Judge for ‘Egregious’ Misconduct, Los Angeles Times, May 25, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 2244483 (judge created the impression that he was allied with the prosecution). 
144 See In re Arthur J. Cieslik, No. 87 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge made “intemperate, rude and sexist remarks to women 
attorneys during official proceedings”); In re John R. Goshgarian, No. 98 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry 
Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge referred to female judge in a derogatory 
and insulting manner).
145 See Michele McPhee, Cases vs. Diamond Dismissed, New York Daily News, April 3, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 4070323 (judge was allegedly so hostile to men in divorce cases that husbands who 
had appeared before her formed a support group and filed complaints of judicial misconduct); Douglas 
Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003 (judge dispensed 
toothbrushes to “deadbeat dads” before packing them off to jail).
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Hispanics,147 Jews,148 Catholics,149 Italian-Americans,150 English,151 Danes,152
Yugoslavians,153 Japanese,154 and otherwise-unidentified undocumented aliens.155 They 
look down on poor people,156 harbor animosity against homosexuals,157 and scold or 
discriminate against women for being prostitutes,158 unwed mothers,159 welfare 
146 See In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620 (Arizona 1994) (“fucking n-----s”); Public Admonishment of 
Judge Richard S. Flier, California Commission on Judicial Performance, May 30, 1995, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/FlierPA_05-30-95.rtf (“good boy”); John Caher, Commuter Tax Fight Next 
on Court Agenda, New York Law Journal, February 4, 2000 (“n--- bitch”); Mickey Ciokajlo, Judge 
Accused of Misconduct; State Agency Cites Behavior, Remarks in Court, Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 2655613 (“boy”).
147 Karen Dorn Steele, Passing Notes: Judge, Clerk Make Ethnic Slurs; Investigation Prompts 
Reprimand, IRE Journal, March 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8759893 (judge referred to Hispanics as 
“greasers”).
148 See Fredric U. Dicker, Panel Slams Judge’s ‘Bizarre’ Religious Remarks, New York Post, 
October 4, 2003, at 2 (Judge insulted lawyer, and when lawyer complained, judge asked if the lawyer was 
Jewish”).
149 See Fredric U. Dicker, Panel Slams Judge’s ‘Bizarre’ Religious Remarks, New York Post, 
October 4, 2003, at 2 (Judge remarked in open court that he would “never” send his children to Catholic 
school – even though he in fact had done so – and stated that in light of press accounts of “what was 
occurring in Catholic schools” he would not permit any funds to be used for Catholic education).
150 Karen Dorn Steele, Passing Notes: Judge, Clerk Make Ethnic Slurs; Investigation Prompts 
Reprimand, IRE Journal, March 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8759893 (judge referred to labor union 
representatives as “mafia”).
151 Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7, 2003 (judge 
engaged in an anglophobic tirade against a defendant of British heritage).
152 Mary Wisniewski, Watching the Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts Commission, Chicago 
Lawyer, March 1999 (judge suggested that Danes have loose sexual morals).
153 Mary Wisniewski, Watching the Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts Commission, Chicago 
Lawyer, March 1999 (judge made arguably disparaging remarks about Yugoslavians).
154 See In re Richard Haugner, California Commission on Judicial Performance, April 11, 1994, 
available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Haugner_PubR_041194.doc (judge made comments that 
were insensitive to persons of Japanese ancestry and reflected possible racial or ethnic bias).
155 See H.G. Reza and Christine Hanley, New Trial for O.C. Migrant, Los Angeles Times, June 5, 
2003, available at 2003 WL 2415238 (judge displayed such overt bias against undocumented aliens that an 
appeals panel found a manifest miscarriage of justice).
156 See, e.g., In re Michelson, 225 Wis. 2d 221, 591 N.W.2d 843 (1999) (bias based on socioeconomic 
status).
157 See, e.g., In re Susan J. McDunn, No. 01 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge allegedly sought to thwart lesbian couples seeking 
adoptions); Reprimand urged for Judge: Remark on Homosexuals Cited, Biloxi, Miss. Sun-Herald, 
December 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101468021 (judge wrote letter to the editor suggesting that 
homosexuals belong in mental institutions).
158 See In re David Cerda, No 76 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge employed the bail system as a means of punishing 
defendants in prostitution cases).   
159 Alisa Lapolt, Reprimand, Training Urged for Racine Judge Over Unwed Mother Remarks, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 2, 1998, available at 1998 WL 14049209 (“I suppose it was too 
much to ask that your daughter keep her pants on and not behave like a slut”).
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abusers,160 and caregivers.161 Bias against particular organizations is also reported.  One 
judge fulminated about the ACLU.162 Another asserted that the defendant in a products 
liability case “would go to any lengths to make life miserable for somebody.”163
Attitudes towards sex crimes evoke particularly shocking displays.  One judg e 
admonished an 11-year old abuse victim that it “takes two to tango.”164  Another labeled
a rape victim as the kind that works men “into a frenzy.”165 A Boston judge described a 
man who had kidnapped and attempted to rape an 11-year-old boy as “on a very low
level” compared with other sex offenders.166  Another judge seemed to countenance a 
teacher who had an affair with a 13-year-old student, remarking, “[i]t’s just something 
between these two people that clicked beyond the teacher-student relationship” and 
suggesting that the affair was a way for the victim to “satisfy his sexual needs.” 167
Personal Misconduct.  Bad judges display an impressive range of private 
foibles.168  They shoplift,169 pass bad checks,170 evade taxes,171 steal from clients,172
160 See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Ralph
G. Gorenstein, 174 Wis.2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989) (judge berated women with minor children for 
abusing the welfare system).
161 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge 
remarked of an absent attorney, “she probably had something more important to do today, like go to a PTA 
meeting”).
162 Stephen Hunt, Remarks by a Judge Upset Attorney, ACLU, Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 4272212 (criticizing ACLU for “whining and complaining” rather than helping 
people).
163 William Kleinknecht, Appeals Court Finds Bias Against Automaker - Cites Judge’s ‘Antagonism’ 
in Case of Accident that Left Teen Paraplegic, Newark Star-Ledger, June 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
18702778.
164 Michael E. Ruane, Md. Judge Warned for Scolding Sex Victim, 11, Washington Post, June 22, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 19615927.
165 In Other Words, Las Vegas Review-Journal, August 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9291270.
166 See, e.g., Joe Fitzgerald, Apology Now Would be Too Little, Too Late, Boston Herald, April 30, 
2003, available at 2003 WL 3023916 (describing how boy was ordered by transsexual to perform a sex act 
at the point of a screwdriver).
167 MichaelAnn Knotts, Judge Reprimanded for Sex Case Remarks, New Jersey Lawyer, May 12, 
2003. 
168 For general treatment, see Steven Lubet, Beyond Reproach: Ethical Restrictions on the 
Extrajudicial Activities of State and Federal Judges (1984).
169 See Inquiry Concerning Garrett, 613 So.2d 463 (Florida 1993) (judge shoplifted a VCR from a 
Target store); In the Matter of Honorable Berlin Jones, Case No. 99-321, Arkansas Judicial Discipline and 
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embezzle from escrow accounts,173 plant evidence,174 make threats,175 extort bribes,176
gamble,177 obstruct justice,178 give misleading testimony,179 breach fiduciary duties,180
Disability Commission, September 21, 2000, available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/JONES.321.PDF
(judge took $10.76 worth of items from hardware store); Liz Fabian, Mayor Will Decide Judge’s Fate 
Monday, Macon Telegraph, May 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2558398 (judge accused of shoplifting 
$80 in groceries from a Kroger store).
170 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Judge James I. Aaron, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, July 8, 2002, available at  http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Aaron%207-8-02.rtf (judge 
attempted to evade financial obligations by writing worthless checks); In the Matter of the Honorable 
Morris W. Thompson, Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, December 6, 1999,
available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/Thompson141.PDF (judge passed 59 bad checks in a four-year 
period); Terry Dickson, Hammill Faces New Complaint: Glynn Magistrate’s Removal Sought, Florida 
Times-Union, October 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25999931 (judge accused of writing more than 40 
bad checks on account of his former law practice ); Circuit Judge Is Removed by Justices, Los Angeles 
Times, June 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2246804 (judge removed from office for offenses including 
writing bad checks).
171 See Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission v. Thompson, 16 S.W.3d 212 (Ark. 2000)
(judge willfully failed to pay federal income taxes); In re Robert J. Dempsey, No. 86 CC-1, Illinois Judicial 
Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge failed to report income from his 
real estate investments to the IRS or state revenue department); In the Matter of the Complaint Against Van 
Susteren, 118 Wis.2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984) (judge failed to timely file state individual income tax 
returns).
172 In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in 
Relation to Howard R. George, a Justice of the Watertown Town Court, Jefferson County, New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 4, 2002, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/george_2002.htm (judge misappropriated funds of 
incarcerated client); Sarah Duran, Lawyer Not Sorry he Blabbed, Tacoma News Tribune, May 8, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 3196984 (judge sold property belonging to a former client in exchange for payments 
on the judge’s Cadillac).
173 See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in 
Relation to Edmund G. Fitzgerald, Jr., a Judge of the City Court of Yonkers, Westchester County, New 
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, July 1, 2002, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/F/fitzgerald.htm (judge improperly cashed checks for personal 
expenses from client escrow account).
174 Dennis Persica, Jeff Judge Arrested in Plot to Plant Drugs, New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 7, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 3102493 (judge accused of planting drugs in the vehicle of an enemy).
175 In re John J. McDonnell, No. 73 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge threatened a man and his wife with a handgun); Kara Blond, 
Suspended Nassau Judge Disbarred for Conduct, Newsday, December 29, 1998, available at 1998 WL 
2699747 (judge sent threatening and harassing letters and faxes to an attorney with whom he was having a 
dispute); Ohio Headlines, Dayton Daily News, January 19, 2001, 2001 WL 3826864 (judge sent a 
threatening letter to a motorist in a road rage incident); Jean Guccione, Los Angeles Man Seeks Court’s 
Protection After Judge’s Threat, Los Angeles Times, October 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2512084 
(judge accused of making death threats against his daughter’s boyfriend).
176 See In re Judge Joseph A. Jaffe, 814 A.2d 308 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc. 2003) (judge indicted for 
extortion).
177 See In re Amati, 776 A.2d 371 (Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline 2002) (judge engaged in 
illegal gambling).
178 See In re Eagen, 814 A.2d 304 (Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline 2002) (judge attempted 
to obstruct grand jury investigation of criminality in which he was involved).
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promote bogus investment schemes,181 forge documents,182 file false police reports183 and 
fraudulently procure mortgages.184 They abuse alcohol,185 prescription medications,186
marijuana187 and methamphetamine,188 get arrested for drunk driving,189 and enter rehab 
179 Inquiry Concerning Hapner, 718 So.2d 785 (Florida 1998) (judge gave inaccurate, incomplete, 
and misleading testimony in a domestic violence proceeding to the effect that she had tape recordings of 
her ex-husband making threats of physical violence). 
180 See, e.g.,  Inqu iry Concerning Former Judge William H. Sullivan, May 17, 2002, California 
Commission on Judicial Performance, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Sullivan%20CN%20Bar%2005-17-02.rtf (judge took unauthorized 
personal loans from trust he was administering).
181 See Inquiry Concerning Judge James I. Aaron, California Commission on Judicial Performance, 
July 8, 2002, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Aaron%207-8-02.rtf (judge promoted Ponzi 
scheme and evaded financial obligations).
182 See In re Lambros J. Kutrubis, No. 99 CC-3C, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge forged signature of former friend on numerous tax returns 
for judge, his wife and entities in which they had an interest).
183 Brendan Smith, Cases Cover a Wide Range, Albuquerque Journal, February 11, 2002, available at 
2002 WL 12685560 (magistrate fired shots at his own car and falsely reported that someone else had done 
so); Editorial, New York Daily News, April 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4070452 (judge claimed that 
she was receiving threatening letters, but the police concluded that she wrote them herself in order to obtain 
round-the-clock police protection).
184 See In re Robert L. Sklodowski, No. 87 CC-4, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge falsely claimed a $15,000 downpayment in mortgage 
application to a bank).
185 See, e.g., William R. Levesque, Report Casts Doubt on Judge’s Rehab Program, St. Petersburg 
Times, June 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 20771369 (detailing judge’s continuing problems with alcohol 
abuse); A ‘Message’ For McFalls: The High Court Suspends the Judge Without Pay, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, April 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3810998 (judge attributed bizarre alcohol-induced behavior 
to trauma from September 11 terrorist attack); Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law, 
Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL 12685479 (judge allegedly drove under the 
influence,  left the scene of accident and lied to police officers); Patricia Huang, Panel Recommends 
Reprimand for Judge, Newark Star-Ledger, February 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13449323 (judge who 
had been convicted of driving under the influence presided over six DUI cases and failed to inform his 
supervisors of the conviction).
186 See In re Judge Steven D. Lawrence, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission, 
DATE, http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/lawrence_12_20_2001.pdf ( ); In Re Appeal of Larsen, 
Pennsylvania Law Weekly, November 4, 2002 (judge found to have engaged in conspiracy related to 
unlawful acquisition of prescription medications).
187 See, e.g., Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (judge flagrantly abused marijuana 
while presiding over capital murder trial); In re Frank D. Edwards, No. 96 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry 
Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge busted for marijuana possession in 
Belize).
188 People Police Log: Az Judge Removed for Misconduct, American Political Network
The Hotline, March 10, 2000 (judge accused of methamphetamine abuse).
189 See, e.g., In the Matter of Michael R. Connor, 589 A.2d 1347 (N.J. 2001)(DUI); Inquiry 
Concerning Former Judge Robert C. Bradley, California Commission on Judicial Performance, June 3, 
1999, available at  http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/BradleyCNCN_06-03-99.rtf (same); In re Honorable 
Lee Munson, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission, September 23, 1999, available at 
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Munson99.204.PDF (same); Don Holland, Panel: Former Judge 
Lost Respect, But Can Recover, Los Angeles Daily News, February 26, 1999, available at 1999 WL 
7016465 (same); Lisa Teachey, Visiting Judge Makes Apology After Conviction in DWI Case, Houston 
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programs at an alarming rate.190 They collect child pornography, 191 solicit prostitutes192
and have sex with mentally disabled people.193 They get into confrontations with 
spouses,194 ex-spouses195 and ex-lovers,196 and commit assaults,197 stalking,198 threats199
and rape.200
Chronicle, April 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3016370 (same); Richard Marosi, State Panel Rebukes 
O.C. Judge in DUI Case, Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2253261 (same).
190 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Former Judge Robert C. Bradley, June 3, 1999, California 
Commission on Judicial Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/BradleyCNCN_06-03-
99.rtf (judge spent 28 days at Betty Ford Center);  Buddy Nevins and Terri Somers, Judge In Rehab 
Program; Decision Comes After Arrest On Alcohol Charge at Beachfront Resort, South Florida Sun-
Sentinel, December 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29960763 (judge committed herself to an alcohol 
rehab program after being charged with drunk and disorderly conduct at resort).
191 See Monte Morin; Jack Leonard, O.C. Judge is Charged With Possession of Child Porn, Los 
Angeles Times, November 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28927626.
192 See, e.g., In re Koch, 890 P.2d 1137 (Arizona 1995) (judge disciplined after being arrested for 
solicitation of prostitution); Linda Kleindienst, Florida Court Orders Reprimand for Judge, Fort Lauderdale 
Sun-Sentinel, June 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22176766 (judge acquitted of charges of solicitation but 
disciplined for attempting to misuse his office after arrest); Court to Decide if Judge Stays on Job; 
Allegheny County Justice Charged with Patronizing Prostitutes, Harrisburg Patriot, November 26, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 5161106 (judge offered undercover policewoman $20 for sex).
193 See Justin Walden, Judge May Face State Investigation, Removal From Bench For Sex Charges, 
Binghamton Press & Sun-Bulletin, November 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101084847 (judge pleaded 
guilty to criminal charge of improper contact with a disabled person); In the Matter of the Proceeding 
Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in Relation to Calvin  M. Westcott, a Justice of 
the Hancock Town Court, Delaware County, New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 
3, 2003, available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/W/westcott_2003.htm (judge convicted of 
charges related to his sexual contact with a mentally disabled person).
194 In the Matter of Turco, 970 P.2d 731 (Washington 1999) (judge pushed his wife to the ground in 
public). 
195 See, e.g., Dennis Opatrny, More Than Half of S.F. Bench up for Re-Election, San Francisco 
Recorder, May 8, 2001 (in plea agreement to avoid conviction, judge agreed to 52-week domestic-violence 
counseling program following confrontation with his estranged wife).
196 See, e.g., In re Koch, 890 P.2d 1137 (Arizona 1995) (judge assaulted his ex-girlfriend); In The 
Matter of Judge Rosemarie R. Williams, 165 N.J.L.J. 560 (August 6, 2001) (judge had repeated violent 
confrontations with her ex-lover).
197 See Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law, Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 12685479 (magistrate suspended for beating a female companion and then fleeing 
from arresting officers).
198 See John J. Goldman, N.Y. Judge Charged in Sex Scandal Keeps His Job, Los Angeles Times, 
November 10, 1992, available at 1992 WL 2840869 (New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler accused of 
stalking and harassment after breakup of romance).
199 See, e.g., In re Koch, 890 P.2d 1137 (Arizona 1995) (judge threatened the life of ex-girlfriend’s 
boyfriend).
200 See Magistrates Need Law Degrees, Albuquerque Journal, March 26, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
15990158 (magistrate charged with criminal sexual penetration).
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Conflict of Interest.  Some judges allow their personal financial interests to come 
into conflict with their official responsibilities.201 Conflicts of this sort are inevitable, 
especially in smaller towns, and can often be cured with disclosure to and consent from 
counsel.  However, judges do not always make such disclosures, even with the conflict is
palpable.202 Judges also moonlight by continuing in law practice after being elevated to 
the bench.203
Inappropriate Behavior in Judicial Capacity. Bad judges display poor judgment 
and inappropriate behaviors when acting in their judicial capacities.  They curse in open 
court204 and in professional relationships.205 They visit pornographic web sites from 
chambers,206 leaf through lingerie catalogs in court,207 ask rape victims for dates,208 and 
201 Jose Arballo Jr., Ex-judge Censured by Panel, Riverside Press-Enterprise, May 18, 2002, available 
at 2002 WL 21272392 (judge purchased a house from a man whose conservatorship he had processed); 
Inquiry Concerning Former Judge William H. Sullivan, May 17, 2002, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Sullivan%20CN%20Bar%2005-17-02.rtf 
(judge presided over a probate matter even though he had handled the decedent’s financial affairs, 
witnessed her will, and served as backup executor).
202 See, e.g., Huffman v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, 42 S.W.3d 386 
(Ark. 2001) (judge issued temporary restraining order in favor of Wal-Mart without disclosing that he 
owned $700,000 in Wal-Mart stock); In re Honorable Gayle Forde, Case No. 96-311, Arkansas Judicial 
Discipline and Disability Commission, available at 
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Ford96.311.PDF (judge failed to disclose that he leased office 
space to an attorney who appeared before him in a case); In re Paul R. Durr, No. 72-CC, Illinois Judicial 
Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge failed to disclose that an attorney 
before him was his business partner).
203 This practice is usually prohibited under the terms of the individual’s appointment and violates 
applicable codes of judicial conduct. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission v.
Thompson, 16 S.W.3d 212 (Ark. 2000) (judge sanctioned for practicing law after elevation to bench).
204 See In re John C. Goshgarian, No. 98 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (“fuck you and your office”); In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620, 623 
(Arizona 1994) (judge stated that attorneys who could not reach a settlement had their “brains fucked up” ); 
Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, Subdivision 4, of The Judiciary Law, In Relation to J. 
Kevin Mulroy, a Judge of the County Court, Onondaga County, New York Law Journal, August 23, 1999 
(“[w]hy don't you give this guy a fucking misdemeanor so I can get out of this fucking black hole of 
Utica”).
205 See In re John C. Goshgarian, No. 98 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge used profanity in referring to other judges).
206 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Former Judge Vincent J. McGraw, California Commission on 
Judicial Performance, April 3, 2003, http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/McGraw%204-3-03.rtf (     );  David 
Ashenfelter, Removal Suggested for Judge, Detroit Free Press, February 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
2542382 (judge used court computers to visit pornographic Internet sites).
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have sex with bailiffs,209 secretaries,210 law clerks,211 court reporters,212 paroled felons,213
and spouses of defendants awaiting sentencing.214
Bad judges are seduced by publicity.  Some serve as their own press agents.215
Others act star-struck.  California judge Judith C. Chirlin presided over a celebrity trial in 
which Main Line Cinemas accused actress Kim Basinger of breach of contract for 
backing out of the movie “Boxing Helena.”  After the studio prevailed at trial, and while 
the case was on appeal, Judge Chirlin attended the premiere of the movie and post-
premiere reception as a guest of the plaintiff.216 Comments to the media can also be a 
trap, as federal district judge Penfield Jackson discovered when the court of appeals ruled 
207 See Robert Becker, State Ousts Judge, Cites Harassment, Chicago Tribune, December 4, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 30798221 (after leafing through lingerie catalog, judge showed it to female state’s 
attorney and asked, “what do you think of this one?” ).
208 Jean Guccione, Judge’s Outside Contact With Victim Questioned, Los Angeles Times, November 
18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25919439 (judge asked rape victim to dinner after sentencing her attacker 
to life in prison).
209 See Lyda Longa, Prosecutor Finishes Inquiry of Judge, Tampa Tribune, May 2, 2001, available at 
2001 WL 5501151 (grand jury criticized a judge for having affair with bailiff).
210 See In re Keith E. Campbell, No. 87 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge had a long-standing personal, romantic and sexual 
relationship with his judicial secretary and fired her when she discontinued the relationship). 
211 See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law, in 
Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (judge had affair with his law clerk).
212 See In re Oliver Spurlock, No. 98 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge had sex in chambers with court reporter).
213 In re Harris, 713 So.2d 1138 (Louisiana 1998) (judge had an extramarital affair with a felon who 
was released on parole pursuant to a sentence that the judge herself had imposed).
214 See Jurist Disqualifies Self in Ex-Judge’s Case, Los Angeles Times, October 3, 2000, available at 
2000 WL 25903128 (judge had sexual relations with the wife of a defendant who was awaiting sentencing 
in his court on kidnapping charges).
215 See In re Samuel G. Harrod, III, No. 80 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at  
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge mass-m ailed news clips, press releases, and other materials
using the county postage machine for franking).
216 See Public Admonishment of Judge Judith C. Chirlin, August 28, 1995, California Commission on 
Judicial Performance, http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/ChirlinPA_08-28-95.rtf. 
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that he had committed judicial misconduct by speaking to reporters about the 
government’s antitrust case against Microsoft.217
Judges sometimes treat their courtrooms as personal space.  One judge displayed 
a crucifix in his courtroom.218 Another distributed religious literature to jurors.219 A 
New York judge reportedly made arrangements for his grandson’s bris over the telephone
in open court with a jury seated and a witness on the stand.220  Several judges brought
loaded revolvers to court.221 One Arkansas judge was in the habit of leaning back in his 
chair, putting his feet on the desk, and spitting chewing tobacco into a cup.222 An 
Oklahoma judge allegedly ate raw hamburger on the bench.223 The bench can even be an 
opportunity to catch up on sleep.224
Sometimes, judges act out of what they conceive to be high spirits or a sense of 
fun.  A California judge sang to criminal defendants, explaining that she had a “happy 
heart.”225 Another maintained a “joking relationship” with a court administrator 
217 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107-17 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 
(2001).
218 See Inquiry Regarding Jose Angel Velasquez, California Commission on Judicial Performance, 
April 16, 1997, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/VelasquezCNCN_04-16-97.rtf.  
219 In re Empson, 562 N.W.2d 817 (Nebraska 1997).
220 Voting No on Elected Judges, New York Daily News, December 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
27989053.
221 See In the Matter of Breitenbach, 482 N.W.2d 54 (Wisconsin 1992) (judge left a loaded revolver 
in a courtroom wastebasket); NY Board Wants Gun-Toting Judge Gone, AP Online, August 18, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 22034995 (judge carried a gun under his robes).
222 Notwithstanding that such conduct fits a cultural stereotype of how country judges ought to 
behave, the state’s Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission concluded that it was subject to 
admonishment for failing to maintain courtroom dignity.  In re Judge Steve Inboden, March 15, 1999, 
available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Inboden1.273.PDF.
223 John Greiner, Judges Can Face Ouster From Bench, Daily Oklahoman, December 30, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 103885756.
224 In the Matter of Carpenter, 17 P.3d 91 (Arizona 2001) (judge attempted to excuse his sleeping on 
the bench as due to narcolepsy).
225 Stuart Pfeifer, Commission Chides Orange County Judge, Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 2254972.
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involving numerous incidents of pranks and sexual banter.226 A Nevada judge played
“Jail House Rock” and other prison-themed songs to suspects awaiting arraignment.227 A 
Nebraska judge lit off fireworks in a colleague’s bathroom.228 A California judge had a 
deputy sheriff handcuff the court interpreter as a joke punishment for lateness.229 Still 
another judge, upon learning the defendant had a snake phobia, introduced a rattlesnake 
head into his cell, triggering an anxiety attack.230
Lack of Candor. Bad judges are untruthful.  They fabricate their backgrounds in 
order to obtain their appointments,231 fail to be forthright in applications for service on 
the bench,232 are evasive in responding to required periodic disclosures of financial 
transactions and interests,233 neglect to inform the authorities about criminal 
convictions,234 and misrepresent the status of their dockets in order to avoid 
226 See Inquiry Concerning Judge John B. Gibson, California Commission on Judicial Performance, 
January 28, 2000, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/GibsonPA_01-28-00.rtf (judge wrote a 
memo offering to “cancel all of the appointments to reverse my vasectomy to have a meeting with you to 
implement new procedures”).
227 In the Matter of the Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107 (Nevada Commission on 
Judicial Discipline, December 1995), available at http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm. 
228 In re Jones, 581 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 2000).
229 Inquiry Concerning Former Judge Arthur S. Block, December 9, 2002, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Block%20Decision%2012-09-02.rtf.
230 In re Honorable Gary T. Friedman, California Commission on Judicial Performance, June 21, 
1993, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Friedman_PubR_062193.doc.
231 See Inquiry Concerning Judge Patrick Couwenberg, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, August 15, 2001, available at 
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/CouwDecision_sign.doc (judge falsely claimed that he was a 
graduate of CalTech, a former CIA operative, and a wounded war veteran).
232 See, e.g., Maurice Possley and Ken Armstrong, Clamor Grows Over Associate Judge Circuit Chief 
Says Hynes’ Ability to Be Fair, Chicago Tribune, November 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2931236 
(judicial candidate failed to disclose that he had committed racial discrimination in jury selection in murder 
case when serving as public prosecutor). 
233 See, e.g, In re Lambros J. Kutrubis, No. 99 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge knowingly failed to disclose loans and lawsuits in statement 
required for members of the judiciary in Illinois).
234 See Richard Marosi, State Panel Rebukes O.C. Judge in DUI Case, Los Angeles Times, June 21, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 2253261 (judge admonished for failing to report DUI conviction to failing to 
report his state Commission on Judicial Performance). 
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acknowledging backlogs.235 When accused of misconduct, they lie to the police,236 the 
press,237 and disciplinary authorities.238 They fail to cooperate with investigators, 239
behave in a contumacious manner in formal misconduct hearings,240 and intimidate,241
suborn,242 or retaliate against243 witnesses.
Electioneering and Purchase of Office.  Bad judges engage in inappropriate 
235 See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dreyfus, 182 Wis.2d 121, 513 
N.W.2d 604 (1994) (judge submitted false certificates of status of pending cases); Inquiry Concerning 
Johnson, 692 So.2d 168 (Florida 1997)( judge repeatedly backdated DUI convictions in order to disguise 
how long she was taking to dispose of cases); In the Matter of Waddick, 232 Wis.2d 733, 605 N.W.2d 861 
(2000) (judge falsely certified that he was up-to-date with his docket when in fact he was behind on 
numerous cases).
236 See In the Matter of Michael R. Connor, 589 A.2d 1347 (N.J. 1991) (judge gave evasive answers 
to officers during traffic stop).
237 See Inquiry Concerning Former Judge Vincent J. McGraw, California Commission on Judicial 
Performance, April 3, 2003, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/McGraw%204-3-03.rtf (judge 
lied to the press when asked whether he viewed pornography on his courthouse computer).
238 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary 
Law in Relation to Reynold N. Mason, a Justice of the Supreme Court, 2nd Judicial District, Kings County , 
New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, June 21, 2002, available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/M/mason.htm (judge failed to cooperate with investigation and 
gave testimony that was evasive and incredible); David Weber, Lopez Inks Pact to Officially End Probe, 
Boston Herald, June 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3027425 (judge lied during the hearing and the 
investigation into her alleged misconduct); New Hampshire Panel Admonishes Chief Justice Brock, Los 
Angeles Times, April 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2480657 (justice of state supreme court lied to 
investigators during impeachment inquiry).
239 See, e.g., In re Keith C. Campbell, No. 87 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge suspended for offenses including failing to cooperate with 
investigators).
240 See Inquiry Concerning Campbell, 426 S.E.2d 552 (Georgia 1993) (judge removed more than 
$15,000 in public moneys from the magistrate’s court); In the Matter of the Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case 
No. 9502-107, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, December 1995, available at 
http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (at formal hearing on disciplinary charges, judge wrongfully 
refused to answer non-incriminating questions posed by special counsel and behaved in contumacious and 
contemptuous manner).
241 David Ashenfelter, Removal Suggested for Judge, Detroit Free Press, February 11, 2003, available 
at 2003 WL 2542382 (judge accused of filing lawsuits against nine witnesses who were scheduled to testify 
against him in judicial disciplinary proceedings); In the Matter of Drury, 602 N.E.2d 1000 (Indiana 
1992)(judge attempted to intimidate ex-girlfriend and her mother who were cooperating with investigation 
of judicial misconduct); Inquiry Concerning Former Judge Arthur S. Block, December 9, 2002, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Block%20Decision%2012-09-02.rtf (judge attempted to intimidate 
several witnesses during investigation into judge’s alleged sexual misconduct).
242 Doan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 902 P.2d 272 (California 1995) (judge asked 
material witnesses not to cooperate with agents and not to discuss a loan given to the judge).
243 See In re Samual G. Harrod, III, No. 80 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge sent an anonymous letter to the estranged wife of the 
prosecuting attorney suggesting lines of investigation she might use in her divorce case and caused bogus 
magazine subscriptions to be mailed to members of the judicial inquiry panel).
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political conduct.244 They volunteer for partisan activities while on the bench245 and 
dispense lucrative appointments in order to curry favor with party leaders.246 Judges, law 
clerks and other courthouse workers who owe their appointments to party patronage are 
expected to attend expensive fundraising dinners for the dominant political party.247
Some judges simply buy their nominations.  In Brooklyn, the Democratic Party 
leadership reportedly sold judgeships for $50,000, with the bribes being distributed up 
and down the party food chain.248  Suspicion of purchase of office also arises when 
judges pay “consultation fees” to politically connected firms at the request of party 
leaders.249
Where party nomination alone is not sufficient to guarantee victory, judges need 
cash and volunteers in order to conduct their campaigns.  Sometimes, judges violate legal 
244 Usually, the office in question is another judgeship (or retention in the judge’s current position).  
Sometimes, however, judges seek to use their judicial posts as a springboard for higher office.  One 
Delaware judge who publicly announced that he was seeking the Republican nomination for Governor 
without resigning his judicial seat received instead a censure and removal from office by the Delaware 
Court on the Judiciary.  In the Matter of Buckson, 610 A.2d 203 (Delaware Court on the Judiciary 1992).
245 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary 
Law in Relation to Ira J. Raab, New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 3, 2003, 
available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/R/raab.html (judge participated as a panelist in a 
political party’s screening interviews of political candidates, appeared at the party’s “phone bank” for a 
candidate for the county legislature and made phone calls on behalf of the candidate).
246 See text accompanying notes __ - __ supra.
247 Party fundraising through courthouses is well-developed in New York State.  In Queens New 
York, nearly 40% of the Democratic Party’s annual revenue comes from courthouse donations.  See 
Clifford J. Levy, Where Parties Select Judges, Donor List is a Court Roll Call, New York Times, August 
18, 2003, at A1, B2.  In Brooklyn, the Democratic Party boss issued a command invitation to judicial 
candidates to attend a $500/head “preprimary cocktail party.”  Nancie L. Katz, B’klyn DA Flags Dems, 
New York Daily News, August 27, 2003, at 25.
248 Kati Cornell Smith and Tom Topousis, Feds Probe Jailed Pol’s Role in 50G ‘Bench Buy,’ New 
York Post, July 10, 2003, at 7.
249 See Nancie L. Katz, Judge Trio Forced to Ante Up 100G?, New York Daily News, July 16, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 58595493 (three candidates for judgeships in Brooklyn, New York were reportedly 
strong-armed to pay $100,000 each to a politically-connected consulting firm as the price for retaining the 
nomination); Supporter of Elian Was Paid by Judge, Los Angeles Times, January 12, 2000, available at 
2000 WL 2200009 (judge paid prominent figure in Miami politics substantial “consulting fees” during her 
election campaign).
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limits on contributions.250  Even if they stay within the law, there is a perhaps-
unavoidable suspicion that they will favor those who provided campaign help.251 Judges 
running for office may also wish to promote themselves in the public eye and to take 
positions on politically controversial issues.  Whether or not such activities constitute a 
person as a bad judge, they are subject to discipline in many jurisdictions252 (although a 
state’s power to impose a sanction is constrained by the first amendment).253
II.  The Policy Tradeoff
Fundamental to the American system of government is the proposition that the 
judicial branch should be independent from the political branches of government.  
250 See Martha Carr, Green Gave Contribution Back, Says Treasurer, New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
September 123, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25255002 (judge returned illegal campaign contribution from 
bail bond company after being caught on videotape accepting an envelop filled with cash from a company 
employee).
251 For outraged criticism of the process, see David Barnhizer, ‘On the Make’: Campaign Funding 
and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 Catholic Law Review 361, 369 (2001) (the system of 
campaign contributions has legalized a “corrupt process” in which lawyers “make payments to judges 
before whom they practice and the payments are legitimated by labeling them as campaign contributions.”).
Whether campaign contributions actually influence case outcomes is unclear.  For a report 
suggesting that such evidence is lacking, at least at the appellate level, see Ronald D. Rotunda, A 
Preliminary Empirical Inquiry into the Connection Between Judicial Decision Making and Campaign 
Contributions to Judicial Candidates, Professional Lawyer (Winter 2003) (examining Illinois, Michigan and 
Wisconsin).  The lack of a correlation in these studies does not necessary mean that campaign contributions 
had no influence, however.  If lawyers know or believe that contributions will influence judges, and also 
know of the contributions made by other lawyers, this knowledge may influence which cases are selected 
for litigation.  See, e.g., Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the 
Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. Legal Studies 
233 (1996); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 Journal of 
Legal Studies 1 (1984).
252 State codes of judicial conduct tend to discourage public statements by judicial candidates.  See 
Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First 
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 Yale Law & Policy Review (2003).
253 See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding that the first amendment prohibits 
the states from gagging judicial candidates on issues of public debate).  For discussion, see Michael R. 
Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and 
Judges as Politicians, 21 Yale Law & Policy Review (2003) (concluding that judicial campaign speech 
should be entitled to a high level of protection under the first amendment).  An important test of the ability 
of the government to restrict political campaign speech by judicial candidates is now underway in New 
York, where Supreme Court Justice Thomas J. Spargo has been accused of violating the state’s code of 
judicial conduct by overtly partisan political statements during his campaign for a judicial seat.  See Spargo 
v. New York State  Commission on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (striking down 
state judicial conduct regulations that prohibited judicial candidates from engaging in political activity and 
requiring candidates to promote confidence in and the integrity of the judiciary).
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Independence safeguards the public against governmental oppression or expropriation 
and protects against corruption of the administration of justice by private interests.  At the 
same time, judges wield enormous authority including the power of judicial review.  
Accordingly, their independence cannot be unlimited.  They must be accountable to the 
public through some type of democratic process.  The tradeoff between independence and 
accountability is unavoidable254 and forms a central problematic for American 
constitutional theory.255
Less commonly recognized is a different set of tradeoffs involving quality of 
judicial action.  Judicial independence requires that judges be insulated from oversight 
and control by parties outside of the judicial branch.256  Thus judges serve for substantial 
terms of office, may not be removed except for gross misconduct, and (at least at the 
federal level) enjoy protection against diminution in their salaries.  The expression of 
judicial independence has gone even beyond the concept that the judicial branch must be 
protected against intrusions by the political branches.  In practical implementation, it 
254 See Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State 
Courts, 61 Law & Contemporary Problems 79 (1998).  The tension between these values may be less 
severe than might be predicted by pure theory. See, e.g., Bruce Fein and Burt Neuborne, Why Should We 
Care About Independent and Accountable Judges, 84 Judicature 58, 61-62 (2000) (cataloging various 
democratic checks on judicial action).
255 Classic treatments of the problem are Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) 
(criticizing power of judicial review); Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 Harvard Law Review 1 (1959) (reconciling independence and accountability through concept of neutral 
principles as a minimal constraint on constitutional adjudication).  Recent treatments of the problem 
include Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We The Court, 115 Harvard Law 
Review 4 (2001) (criticizing concept of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation); Barry 
Friedman and Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 Indiana Law Journal 123 (2003) (arguing 
that judicial review is generally consistent with intent of sitting Congress); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an 
Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale Law Journal 153 (2002) 
(chronicling academic treatment of the tension between independence and accountability).
256 For discussion, see, e.g., John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining 
Judicial Independence, 72 Southern California Law Review 353 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts 
of Judicial Independence, 72 Southern California Law Review 535 (1999); Alex Kozinski, The Many Faces 
of Judicial Independence, 14 Georgia State University Law Review 861 (1998); Judith S. Kaye, 
Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 Hofstra Law 
Review 703 (1997).
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entails granting trial courts substantial autonomy even from oversight and control within 
the judicial branch.257  American trial judges are satraps with powers small in extent but
vast within the ambit of their potency.   
The independence of American trial judges interacts in a complex way with the 
quality of their work product.  On the one hand, independence is itself a quality-
enhancing policy.  If judges are not independent, they will be subject to influence that 
could distort the outcomes of cases, skew the development of substantive law, and detract 
from public confidence in the judicial system.  Along this dimension, independence is 
positively correlated with quality.  On the other hand, independence also comes with a 
cost.  Power unchecked becomes power abused.  A corporate executive who performs 
badly can be penalized by receiving lower compensation or suffering a demotion, and 
must be prepared to receive criticism from others in a team setting.  But in a world of 
perfect judicial independence, such constraints would not apply to trial judges.  Even if 
they perform badly, they would still receive deference from lawyers who appear before 
them, would still retain the status, salary, and perquisites of office, and would still be 
emperors of their small domains.  Human beings in robes,258 judges shirk when they can 
get away with it.259
Accountability also interacts with quality of judicial action.  Like independence, 
accountability is partially justified as a performance-enhancing measure.  It provides a 
method for penalizing judges who provide poor service to the public.  Judges who are 
257 See, e.g., Urquhart v. Davis, 19 S.W.3d 21 (Ark. 2000) (“independence of the bench in our 
judicial system requires that the trial judge control his docket and the disposition of matters filed”).
258 See Richard Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? The Same Thing as Everyone Else, 3 Supreme 
Court Economic Review 1 (1993) (judges value prestige, leisure, reputation, and deference from others, 
among other things).
259 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976).
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known to be corrupt, abusive, or biased can be voted out of office; and those who are 
unqualified may not be elected.  Accountability also provides a democratic check in the 
substantive development of the law, at least at the higher levels of the judiciary.  A judge 
who is too liberal or too conservative, too coddling of criminals or too favorable toward 
the prosecution, can face criticism for those decisions and possible sanction from the 
voters.
At the same time, the value of accountability can harm quality.  If judges were 
completely “accountable” in a political sense, they would become passive tools of the 
popular will.  The coherence, consistency, and durability of legal rules would be
threatened, and protection of minority rights undermined.  Moreover, with accountability 
comes politics, and with politics comes electioneering, influence-peddling, interest 
groups, patronage and corruption.  Thus accountability too is a double-edged sword as far 
as quality is concerned.
The problem for public policy is to devise structures of governance and authority 
that minimize the total costs associated with these parameters.260  It should be evident 
that there is no corner solution.  We cannot afford to sacrifice any one of these values in 
order to enhance the others.  Any sensible policy will seek to preserve a substantial level 
of each.  The issue is how to structure a cost-effective mix of strategies taking account of
all the competing values.
III. Existing Approaches
260 As well as others, such a efficiency, which would need to be considered in an complete theory of 
judicial organization.
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Any solution to the problem of bad judges, all agree, lies in the process of 
selection, retention, supervision and removal.261  The options fall into three broad 
categories: case-specific public remedies; systemic public remedies; and p rivate 
remedies.
A.  Case-Specific Public Remedies
Impeachment.  Impeachment is the traditional means for dealing with offending 
judges.  It was the sole mechanism in the states until the advent of judicial disciplinary 
commissions in the 1960s262 and remains the only way to remove a federal judge.263
Impeachment has the value that it is a well-recognized, traditional method for 
disciplining bad judges.  If grounded in a constitution, it poses no problems under 
doctrines of separation of powers.  It is also a high-profile process with significant 
opportunities for public participation and input.
Impeachment is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of bad judges, however.  
Legislators usually don’t want to get involved in the impeachment business, which is 
distracting and offers few political payoffs.  The only recent judicial impeachments of 
note in the states were those of New Hampshire Justice David Brock in 2000 (which 
resulted in an acquittal)264 and Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen in 1993 
(which resulted in a conviction).265  At the federal level, only three federal judges have 
261 For the classic study, see Evan Haynes, The Selection and Tenure of Judges (1944).  A recent 
study is Reports of the Task Forces of Citizens for Independent Courts, Uncertain Justice: Politics and 
America’s Courts (2000).
262 See, e.g., http://www.alalinc.net/jic/docs/jicfy2001.pdf  (Alabama Judicial Commission  
established in 1972; previously, only remedy was impeachment).
263 See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 (federal judges serve during “good behavior); id.  Art. I, § 2, cl. 5 
(procedures for impeachment).
264 See Holly Ramer, Judges Criticized for Aiding Boss, AP Online, April 26, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 19779728.
265 See Jerome C. Meites and Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the 
Assault on Judicial Independence, 29 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 741 (1999) (describing 
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been impeached in the past half century: Harry E. Claiborne, Alcee L. Hastings and 
Walter L. Nixon.266  Each was convicted and removed.  The relatively small number of 
impeachments suggests that the remedy is ineffective as a general approach to the bad 
judges problem.267  Impeachment, moreover, is an all-or-nothing remedy: a judge is 
either convicted and removed, or acquitted and allowed to remain in office.  These polar 
choices limit the possibilities for administering sanctions short of removal in cases where 
the judge’s conduct is subject to censure but not of sufficient gravity to warrant the 
constitutional penalty.268
Impeachment inevitably threatens judicial independence.  Although in recent 
times judges have not been impeached for overtly political reasons, this has not always 
been the case.  The impeachment of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase was 
partially an effort by political adversaries to destroy a hated rival.269  Politically 
motivated demands to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren were heard during the 1960s,270
Larson case).  A committee of the Illinois House of Representatives investigated impeachment charges 
against Chief Justice James D. Heiple in 1997 but recommended that no action be taken.  See id.
266 See Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, The Hamilton Affair, and Other 
Constitutional Mythologies, 77 North Carolina Law Review 1791, 1834-1837 (1999) (providing a history 
of federal judicial impeachments).
267 The raw number of impeachments, however, does not tell the full story because judges may resign
to avoid impeachment. See See Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, The Hamilton Affair, 
and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 North Carolina Law Review 1791, 1837-1841 (1999) (describing 
instances where federal judges resigned rather than face impeachment).
268 The formal restriction on sanction, however, is not quite as severe a limitation as may appear at 
first blush.  Even if a judge is not convicted, an impeachment is a black mark to be avoided if possible.  
And even if the investigating body does not refer an impeachment to the trier of fact, it may issue a report 
scathing the judge, as happened in Illinois during the investigation into charges against Chief Justice 
Heiple.  See Jerome C. Meites and Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the 
Assault on Judicial Independence, 29 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 741 (1999) (reproducing 
Illinois House committee report recommending against impeachment).
269 See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase 
and President Andrew Johnson (1992) (Chase impeached in part because he attempted to enforce Sedition 
Act).
270 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Judicial Activism or Judicial Necessity: The D.C. District Court’s 
Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 Georgetown Law Journal 685, 693 (2002) (discussing John Birch Society’s 
campaign to impeach Chief Justice Warren).
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and candidates continue to call for impeachment of judges who issue unpopular 
decisions.271
Impeachment is limited to gross misconduct.272  It is not an effective remedy for 
dealing with judges who are incompetent, irritable, or ideologically biased, nor does it 
address cases of private misconduct by judges unless the offenses are severe.  
Impeachment, moreover, works only for judges in high positions (such as the 
jurisdiction’s supreme court); it does not work for the low-level posts where bad judging 
is most frequently observed.  
Recusal and Disqualification.  Another remedy is for the concerned party to seek
a judge’s removal from the case.  The basis for such removal could be either recusal or 
disqualification.  Disqualification tends to be based on relatively precise criteria, is 
nondiscretionary, and in general cannot be waived by the parties.  Recusal is a more 
generalized obligation or power of a judge to remove herself for a specified reason or
even for no reason at all.273
Recusal and disqualification are useful remedies for certain types of bad judging.  
They can be effective at screening out judges who have a financial or personal interest in
the litigation.  They can also police, albeit imperfectly, against judges whose involvement 
271 Presidential candidate Robert Dole called for the impeachment of federal judge Harold Baer after 
the latter suppressed evidence seized by police in a traffic stop. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans 
Target ‘Judicial Activism’; Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, 
Washington Post, September 14, 1997, available at 1997 WL 12886568.
272 See Paul S. Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 Northwestern University Law 
Review 719 (1970) (surveying history of judicial impeachments and concluding that the “only 
generalization that can safely be made is that an impeachable offense must be serious in nature”).
273 Federal standards for recusal and disqualification are codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.  State 
grounds can be contained in the state constitution, see, e.g., Texas Constitution, Article V, § 11, an 
applicable statute, see, e.g., Cal Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, or a rule of court, see, e.g., Texas R. Civ. Pro. 
18.b(2).  Also relevant are applicable codes of judicial conduct.  While these codes will not usually provide 
independent grounds for recusal or disqualification, they are persuasive. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 539 
S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, no writ) (judicial ethics code persuasive but not controlling on 
question of recusal).
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in a case has become overly personal or adversarial.  However, recusal and 
disqualification are far from a complete solution to the bad judges problem.
Recusal and disqualification are simultaneously over-inclusive and under-
inclusive.  They can operate rigidly and thus exclude judges whose interest in a case 
cannot plausibly result in prejudice against a party.274  To the extent recusal and 
disqualification are over-inclusive, they can impose unnecessary costs and delay on the 
administration of justice, and can be used by parties for strategic purposes rather than to 
protect a bona fide interest in avoiding biased results.  Even more problematically, 
recusal and disqualification do not exclude judges in many situations in which a party 
might legitimately want a case tried before a different judge.  For example, a lawyer 
might suspect a particular judge of being corrupt, but have no hard evidence to back this 
up.  Mere suspicion of corruption would not provide grounds for recusal and if mentioned 
at all might land the attorney in trouble.275 Recusal and disqualification are not available 
to challenge a judge on grounds that she is incompetent or dilatory.  Nor will these
procedures provide a basis for removing a judge who is waspish or ill-tempered so long 
as the abuse is dispensed on an evenhanded basis.  They offer little help for litigants
before judges who display poor judgment or inappropriate behaviors.  They do nothing 
about judges who abuse their positions for personal gain or who behave in their personal 
lives in ways reflecting adversely on their capacity in office.  
274 See, e.g., Ziona Hochbaum, Note, Taking Stock: The Need to Amend 28 U.S.C. § 455 to Achieve 
Clarity and Sensibility in Disqualification Rules for Judges’ Financial Holdings, 71 Fordham Law Review 
(2003) (describing a case in which a federal judge would have to disqualify herself even if her stake in the 
outcome of a case was one penny).
275 The attorney might even face a citation for contempt.  See, e.g., Laughlin v United States, 151 
F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 777 (1945) (upholding contempt citation against attorney who 
sought disqualification of trial judge on the ground that the President had picked the judge in order to 
secure a conviction).
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Recusal and disqualification do not even address many cases where the judge 
might in fact be prejudiced.  Judges known to favor a particular ideological point of view 
are not subject to recusal for that reason alone, even when the case before them 
implicates the very values for (or against) which the judge has fought during her 
professional life.  Animosity or partiality developed in a proceeding will also generally 
not be a sufficient ground for exclusion.276  Even if a trial judge has displayed hostility 
towards a party or her attorney, this fact alone would not be sufficient to require recusal 
unless it evidences such deep-seated bias or antagonism as to make fair judgment 
impossible.  Recusal is also not generally required merely because the judge has accepted
campaign contributions from an attorney or litigant.277
Recusal and disqualification place the initial decision in the very judge whose 
removal is sought.  There is always a risk that the judge will resent having her 
impartiality questioned.  If the judge does take umbrage and refuses to recuse, the party 
who sought disqualification may face hostility for the remainder of the trial.278 Because 
denials of motions to recuse or disqualify are interlocutory, the losing party may have no 
appeal until after a judgment on the merits.279  Even then, the standard of appellate 
276 The extrajudicial source doctrine provides that except in extraordinary circumstances, recusal is 
not required when the only basis on which removal is sought is events occurring in the judicial process.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (holding the extrajudicial source doctrine 
applicable to recusal of federal judges).
277 For a notorious example, see Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 843  (Tex. App. 
1987, no writ) (judge did not recuse even though trial counsel had contributed $10,000 to his campaign 
fund after the lawsuit was filed).
278 See Roger M. Baron, A Proposal for the Use of a Judicial Peremptory Challenge System in Texas, 
40 Baylor Law Review 49, 57-58 (1988) (judges can become enraged if parties challenge their 
impartiality).
279 See Lopez v. Behles, 14 F.3d 1497, 1499 (10th Ci r.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 818 (1994) (denial of 
motions to recuse are interlocutory and not immediately appealable).  But see Durhan v. Neopolitan, 875 
F.2d 91, 96-96 (7th Cir. 1989) (denials of motions to recuse may not be appealed after final judgment).  
However, as discussed below, the appellate court might grant a discretionary interlocutory appeal or might 
grant the moving party a writ prohibiting the challenged judge from taking further action on the case.  See 
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan v. Superior Court of Guam, 2003 WL 21135713 (Guam 2003) (granting 
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review is usually the deferential “abuse of discretion” test.280  Recusal is thus a high-risk 
strategy because of the danger it will be refused.  Motions to recuse, moreover, are not 
seemly proceedings; they focus the attention of the judge (and sometimes the public) on 
the judge’s own failings and biases.  They do not enhance public confidence in the legal
system.
Appeal.  The right of appeal can correct some of the mistakes of bad judges and 
acts as a deterrent against judges making improper rulings in the first place.  Appeals can 
have the additional virtue of generating a public decision by the appellate tribunal which 
can embarrass a bad judge and bring public attention to his or her deficiencies, as well as 
warning other judges of the fate that awaits them if they make similar mistakes.   Appeals 
also preserve judicial independence because the correction of error occurs within the 
judicial branch.
The right of appeal, however, is only a partial and limited remedy for the problem 
of bad judges.281 Appeals offer relief only when acts of bad judging go to the correctness 
of the decision under review.  If a judge sexually harasses a staff member, commits an act 
of personal misconduct which reflects on capacity in office but does not impeach the 
decision in a particular case, or acts inappropriately on the bench in a way that does not 
relate to the merits of the decision being appealed, the right of appeal will provide no 
redress.   Even if the judge makes an error due to incompetence, this may not be subject 
to correction on appeal if the standard of review is a deferential one such as abuse of 
discretion.  Appeals are also costly and protracted, and many litigants may simply accept 
peremptory writ restraining trial judge from scheduling further proceedings); text accompanying notes 
____ infra.
280 See, e.g., Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1508 (10th Cir.1995) (abuse of 
discretion test applies to appeals from denials of motions to recuse).
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a bad decision rather than incur the additional expense and uncertainty.  Finally, the right 
of appeal is over-inclusive: while it picks up some bad judges, it also captures many 
adequate judges who simply make errors (as all judges do), or even good judges who 
decide issues of first impression in a different way than the appellate court.  Although 
reversal on appeal does provide some information about the capacities of the lower court 
judge, it is a noisy signal that cannot reliably separate good judges from bad.
Mandamus. Another method for controlling bad judges is through a writ of 
mandamus or other extraordinary relief.282 Mandamus can be most helpful as a check on 
trial judges who improperly deny recusal or disqualification motions.  The ordinary 
procedure would be for a disappointed party to seek interlocutory relief from the 
appellate court.  Given the difficult situation that a party faces if her motion to recuse or 
disqualify is refused, appeals courts generally recognize that a petition for mandamus is 
an appropriate way to challenge the trial court’s denial of the motion.283 Mandamus may 
also be useful in correcting other instances of bad judging when the trial court has clearly 
overstepped the bounds of her powers and adequate relief cannot be obtained through 
other means.284
The mandamus procedure, however, is hedged in by significant restrictions.  
Mandamus is not a proper remedy for trial court errors on the merits, or even for 
281 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining “Good Behavior” for 
Federal Judges, 87 Michigan Law Review 765 (1989).
282 See generally Brent D. Ward, Can the Federal Courts Keep Order in Their Own House? Appellate 
Supervision Through Mandamus and Orders of Judicial Councils, 1980 Brigham Young University Law 
Review 233 (1980).
283 See, e.g., United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 996 n. 9 (10th Cir. 1993); In re School Asbestos 
Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 777-78 (3d Cir.1992).  But see In re City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160, 1165-67 (6th 
Cir. 1987) (denying right to challenge denials of motions to recuse by petitions for a writ of mandamus).
284 For example, an appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus when a trial judge egregiously 
delays action on a matter.  See, e.g., Urquhart v. Davis, 19 S.W.3d 21 (Ark. 2000) (granting writ of 
mandamus upon finding that judge had no good cause to delay ruling on petitioner’s motion for summary 
judgment).  
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incompetence.  It does not address most instances of judicial misconduct and provides no 
remedy for judges who misbehave in their personal lives.  Moreover, mandamus does not 
generally rectify harms that have already occurred unless the error is ongoing.  When
mandamus is available, the standard of review will usually be even more deferential than 
the “abuse of discretion” standard that applies on appeal.285 Generally, the petitioner 
must show a clear and indisputable right to relief, as where the trial judge has committed 
a “clear” abuse of discretion or conduct amounting to a usurpation of authority.286  These 
restrictions make mandamus a poor vehicle for dealing with the problem of bad judges 
generally.
Liability.  Legal liability is another means by which the system could police
against bad judges in a given case.287 A judge who violates a cognizable legal right 
entitling a party to relief may be subject to a penalty that could provide a remedy for the 
right infringed, deter future misconduct, and embody a public censure of the judge’s 
conduct.  
Legal liability can punish and deter certain types of misconduct.  Outside their 
judicial roles, judges are liable just as other citizens for torts, crimes, breaches of 
contract, and violation of statutory obligations.288  Even within their judicial roles, judges 
285 See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (higher standard than abuse of discretion applies 
to mandamus petitions).
286 Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989) (articulating standards for 
granting writ).
287 For general discussion, see, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Civil Liability of Judges in the United 
States, 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 655 (1989); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Immunity from 
Civil and Criminal Liability. 27 San Diego  Law Review 1 (1990).
288 For example, judges who engage in sexual harassment would ordinarily not be protected even if 
the misconduct was committed on courthouse property against a court employee   See, e.g., Forrester v,
White, 484 US 219 (1988) (administrative acts not generally within the scope of judicial immunity); 
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993) (touchstone of judicial immunity is resolving of 
disputes among parties); Archie v. Lanier, 95 F3d 438 (6th Cir. 1996) (judge’s sexual harassment of job 
applicants and litigants not protected by judicial immunity).
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can be liable if they act outside of any colorable claim to jurisdiction,289 if the opposing 
party seeks only equitable relief against a continuing course of wrongful judicial 
conduct,290 or if the judge engages in criminality in office such as bribery or extortion.291
Legal liability, however, is far from a complete solution to the problem of bad 
judges.  Much of the conduct in which bad judges engage does not fall into any well-
recognized basis for liability.  Judges do not owe fiduciary duties to litigants.  They are 
not subject to personal liability if they have a conflict of interest in the proceeding.  
Similarly, judges owe no personally enforceable duties to avoid erroneous rulings.  The 
remedies for judicial error are procedures for correcting the outcome of the ruling, not 
personal claims against the judge.  Nor will a judge, ordinarily, be subject to legal 
liability for being rude or displaying inappropriate behavior on the bench.
Even if a judge’s actions would be a basis for liability if performed by an ordinary 
person, judicial immunity shields the judge from liability for civil damages for acts 
undertaken in an official capacity,292 even when the conduct is malicious or in bad 
289 See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (judges who undertake a purportedly judicial 
action in the complete absence of jurisdiction may not be protected against claims for damages).  Thus, the 
judge described in text accompanying note __, supra, who made a citizens arrest and then held an 
unauthorized midnight proceeding in the police station could well have been liable for money damages.
290 See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (upholding grant of injunctive relief and award of 
attorneys fees against state magistrate for violations of federal civil rights).  Pulliam was partially overruled 
by the  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (providing that in § 1983 actions against judges for alleged constitutional violations, 
injunctive relief is not available if a declaratory judgment would be adequate).
291 See Ex parte Virginia, 100 US 339 (1880) (state judge not immune from prosecution for depriving 
citizens of federal civil rights); United States v. Claiborne 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
829 (1984) (federal judge could be prosecuted for income tax evasion committed while in office); United 
States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1094 (1983) (federal judge 
prosecuted for bribery and extortion committed while in office); Note, Bribery And Other Not So “Good
Behavior”: Criminal Prosecution As a Supplement To Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 Columbia Law 
Review 1617 (1994).
292 E.g., Forrester v White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) (describing judicial immunity as “comparatively 
sweeping”); Pulliam v Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529-536 (1984) (providing a history of judicial immunity).
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faith.293 The broad scope of judicial immunity is illustrated by Mireles v. Waco,294 a 
classic bad judge case.  The trial judge allegedly authorized law enforcement personnel to 
use excessive force in seizing an attorney who failed to appear at a calendar call.  The 
Supreme Court held that even if excessive force had been used, it did not avail the 
plaintiff; the conduct in question was in aid of the court’s jurisdiction and that was 
sufficient to establish the judge’s immunity.
Discipline.  Another approach to bad judges is to establish procedures for 
receiving allegations of judicial misconduct, screening and investigating such complaints, 
and imposing an appropriate sanction for verified offenses.295  At the federal level, 
responsibility for disciplining judges falls to the Chief Judge of each circuit and to the 
circuit Judicial Councils.  Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,296 any 
person may file a written complaint with the clerk of the relevant court of appeals 
containing a brief statement of the facts upon which the complaint is based. 297  The clerk 
is required to promptly transmit the complaint to the Chief Judge of the circuit as well as 
to the judge whose conduct is questioned.  The Chief Judge screens the complaint and 
293 See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (judicial immunity not overcome by allegations 
of bad faith or malice); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (“immunity applies even when the judge 
is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”).  The rationale is that imposing exposure to damages 
liability would unduly interfere with a judge’s independence of action.  See, e.g., Forrester v White, 484 
U.S. 219, 226 (1988) (concern for judicial “timidity” that would result if judges feared personal liability).
294 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
295 In addition to formal discipline, these procedures can include informal mechanisms by which peer 
pressure may be applied to judges whose conduct falls short of expectations. See Charles Gardner Geyh, 
Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 243 (1993).
296 Pub.L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c). Congress revisited 
the issue in 1990 by establishing the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, a body 
charged with investigating and studying the problems of disciplining and removing Article III judges and 
recommending potential reforms. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-650, tit. IV, § 410, 
104 Stat. 5089, 5124.
297 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1).
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either dismisses it,298 finds that an appropriate corrective action has already been taken, 
or refers the matter to a special committee.299 If the third option is chosen, a committee 
consisting of the Chief Judge and an equal number of circuit and district judges 
investigates the complaint and reports its findings to the Judicial Counsel of the circuit, 
which presumably then undertakes an appropriate intervention to redress the problem.300
All states and the District of Columbia have also created agencies tasked with 
articulating standards for proper judicial conduct301 and investigating and sanctioning 
misconduct.302  Commission members are drawn from the judiciary, the bar, and the 
general public.303  In some states, the judicial conduct commission has only the power to 
recommend punishments (other than informal sanctions such as admonishments).304  In 
other states the commission itself has sanctioning authority.  In some cases, there are two 
commissions – one to investigate and prosecute complaints, the other to act in a judicial 
capacity to determine punishment.305
These judicial disciplinary bodies have significantly improved policing against 
bad judges.  They maintain staff knowledgeable in disciplinary matters and professionally 
tasked with responsibility for maintaining the integrity and quality of the judicial system.  
298 Grounds for dismissal are that the complaint as not in conformity with the statute, is directly 
related to the merits, or frivolous.  28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
299 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(2-4).
300 28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
301 These commissions typically have the power to issue advisory opinions on matters of judicial 
ethics. See, e.g., http://www.alalinc.net/jic/docs/jicfy2001.pdf  (Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission).
302 See generally Cynthia Gray, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work (1999);
http://www.alalinc.net/jic/docs/jicfy2001.pdf  (Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission); 
http://www.courts.state.wi.us/judcom/ (Wisconsin Judicial Commission).
303 See, e.g., http://www.alalinc.net/jic/docs/jicfy2001.pdf  (Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission 
has seven members: 3 judges, 2 lawyers, and 2 non-lawyers); http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/CONDUCT.htm 
(Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct composed of three judges, three experienced lawyers, and three 
members of the general public).
304 See, e.g., Joe Gyan Jr., Five to Take Seats on La. Judiciary Commission, Baton Rouge Advocate, 
December 19, 1998, available at 1998 WL 4923164 (Louisiana Judiciary Commission is allowed to make 
recommendations for sanctions, but the penalty is determined by the state supreme court).
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Because they have available to them a wide range of possible sanctions, they are able to 
devise punishments suitable for the offense.  Unlike other approaches to bad judges, their 
purview extends to the full range of problems of bad judging identified earlier in this 
paper.  
However valuable their contribution, these bodies are not a complete solution to 
the bad judges problem.  Partly because they do not report to any other governmental 
body, they are often charged with being overly lax and, in effect, captured by the judges 
they are purportedly policing.306  Critics point out that state disciplinary commissions 
dismiss the vast majority of complaints filed without even holding a hearing.307  When 
sanctions are meted out, they are usually minor: admonishments,308 reprimands, 
reprovals,309 censures,310 or transfers to another court.  The harshest sanction, dismissal 
305 In Illinois, the Judicial Inquiry Board investigations allegations of misconduct, while the Illinois 
Courts Commission decides guilt and punishment. Illinois Constitution, Art. VI, § 15(b) – (j).
306 In some cases, the sanctioning body is comprised of judges, which can lead to the appearance of 
cronyism and conflicts of interest. In Illinois, for example, a Supreme Court Justice who was himself under 
investigation for misconduct appointed the chairman of the commission charged with administering 
sanctions for judicial misconduct.  Mary Wisniewski, Watching the Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts 
Commission, Chicago Lawyer, March 1999.
307 See, e.g., Thomas D. Williams, Confidential Justice for Judges; Complaints Handled Far From 
The Public Eye, Hartford Courant, April 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6357513  (Connecticut’s Judicial 
Review Council dismissed 97% of complaints during its 17-year history).  This low level of action on 
complaints is not due to any nefarious or improper motives on the part of the disciplinary commissions, but 
rather to the fact that the vast majority of complaints referred to these commissions are either frivolous or 
are simply attempts by disappointed litigants to reargue the correctness of decisions.  See Jeffrey N. Barr & 
Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self- Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence Under the 
Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 25, 34
(1993) (empirical study finding that the vast majority of complaints against federal judges were frivolous or 
went to the merits).
308 See, e.g., Mary Wisniewski, Watching the Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts Commission, 
Chicago Lawyer, March 1999 (38 judges privately admonished in one year); 
mhttp://www.state.ar.us/jddc/decisions.html (Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission 
website reporting instances of admonishment).
309 See, e.g., http://www.cjp.ca.gov/pubdisc.htm (reporting on numerous instances of reprovals by the 
California Commission on Judicial Performance).
310 See Two Judges Face Censure for Judicial Misconduct, Salt Lake Tribune, January 7, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 3340968; Mary Wisniewski, Watching The Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts 
Commission, Chicago Lawyer, March 1999 (Illinois Supreme Court judge censured for misconduct); In the 
Matter of Honorable William McKimm, Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, 
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from office, is rare.311  State judicial disciplinary commissions are also seen as lacking 
the resources to act as effective enforcers.  They typically operate with restricted 
budgets,312 have limited full-time staffs,313 and often do not employ full-time 
investigators.314  Commission members serve on a near-volunteer basis, receiving only 
per diem and expense compensation.315  Fair or not, the perception that these 
commissions are relatively toothless both undermines their authority and reduces their 
effectiveness at maintaining public confidence in the judicial system.
It would be possible to upgrade the potency of these commissions, for example by 
increasing their budgets or mandating more onerous sanctions.  In some cases, increases 
in funding or powers could be beneficial.  It is not clear, however, that such changes 
would always help.  Increased budgets and staff have to be paid for somehow, either 
through taxes or cutbacks in other services.  Further, as the size and budgets of these 
commissions increase, and as they get career staff, they themselves may become 
entrenched bureaucracies more devoted to maintaining their positions and perquisites 
than to maintaining the quality of the judicial system.  There are also dangers with 
enhanced sanctions and standards of conduct.  The judicial task is discretionary, and it 
November 20, 1998, available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/mckimm_97-284_final.pdf 
(censure for failing to handle cases in timely fashion and failing to cooperate with investigation).
311 See Thomas D. Williams, Confidential Justice for Judges; Complaints Handled far From the 
Public Eye, Hartford Courant, April 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6357513 (no dismissals in 17 years).
312 See, e.g., Thomas D. Williams, Confidential Justice for Judges; Complaints Handled Far From 
The Public Eye, Hartford Courant, April 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6357513 (total annual budget for 
Connecticut commission was $205,555); Mary Wisniewski, Watching The Watchdogs Watch: The JIB 
And Courts Commission, Chicago Lawyer, March 1999 (academic commentators recommend increased 
budget for judicial disciplinary agencies).
313 See, e.g., Timothy R. Brown, Increasing Number of Judges Being Judged in Miss. Courts, Baton 
Rouge Advocate, January 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 5022306 (judicial commissions are hampered by 
budget shortfalls and may be unable to pay enough to attracted qualified professional staff).
314 See Thomas D. Williams, Confidential Justice for Judges; Complaints Handled Far From The 
Public Eye, Hartford Courant, April 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6357513 (Connecticut’s commission 
employed no full-time investigators and spent an average of $1,000 per year on investigations).
315 See, e.g., http://www.alalinc.net/jic/docs/jicfy2001.pdf  (Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission).
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could be inadvisable to chill the judge’s exercise of judgment or her ability to control the 
conduct of litigation.  Moreover, if sanctions become too severe or the standards for 
judicial conduct set too high, good judges may leave the bench in order to avoid the risk 
of being penalized for actions taken in good faith, and excellent candidates might be 
deterred from seeking to replace them.
Exacerbating the perception that judicial conduct commissions are too cozy with 
judges is the suspicion of the secrecy in which they operate.  The federal statute requires 
that “all papers, documents, and records of proceedings relating to investigations . . . 
shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person in any proceeding.”316
State commissions also typically meet in secret, unless the matter is deemed serious 
enough to warrant a public hearing.317  They do not disclose the names of judges against 
whom complaints are filed unless the allegations result in a sanction.318 The perception
of excessive secrecy in these commissions might be addressed by measures mandating 
greater transparency.  But if all complaints against judges were publicly disclosed, no 
matter how frivolous, the effects could be counterproductive: the dignity of the judiciary 
could be undermined, public confidence in the rule of law could be impaired, and judges 
316 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14).
317 See, e.g., Consider This, Syracuse Post-Standard, January 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
5808824 (in New York, hearings of the Commission on Judicial Conduct are closed to the public); Jean 
Guccione, More Elected Than Appointed Judges Disciplined in ‘90s, Los Angeles Times, December 1, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 103221370 (California proceedings are confidential).
318 See, e.g., Tom Schoenberg, Secretive Panel Has Job of Overseeing Judges, Legal Times, May 7, 
2001, p. 15 (District of Columbia judicial oversight body keeps its deliberations secret and has never 
publicly disciplined a judge); Amy Joi Bryson and Bob Bernick Jr, Lawmakers Aim to Boost Judges’
Accountability, Deseret News, January 30, 2003, available at 2003 WL 11718744 (In Utah, 94 percent of 
substantiated findings of judicial misconduct are never made public); Reprimanding Judges, Salt Lake 
Tribune, October 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4272065 (in Utah, the identities of judges who have been 
reprimanded are not publicly disclosed); Matthew Eisley, Voters in Dark About Judges’ Ethical Records, 
Raleigh News & Observer, October 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 11742420 (North Carolina Judicial 
Standards Commission reportedly handed out more than 100 private admonitions to judges, but has never 
released the substance of the charges nor the names of the sanctioned judges); Glenn Puit, ACLU Lawsuit: 
Secrecy of Judicial Complaints Targeted, Las Vegas Review-Journal November 22, 2002, available at 2002 
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could feel intimidated in the performance of their tasks.  It may be that existing 
protections of confidentiality draw a reasonable line between competing policy 
considerations.
Finally, increasing the powers and authority of judicial disciplinary commissions 
carries a threat to judicial independence.319  The inevitable conflicts between the 
commissions and judges under investigation can arouse suspicion that the commissions 
are acting in a vengeful or vindictive way.320   The jurisdictions of these commissions can 
also spark problems.  While it is appropriate for them to investigate allegations of judicial 
misconduct, it is out of bounds to criticize judges for the merits of decisions.321  But the 
line between these two is always clear-cut.322
B.  Public Systematic Remedies
Electoral Reforms. Numerous reforms have been proposed to improve the 
procedures for electing judges and thereby select better candidates for the bench.  
One possible approach would be to reduce the influence of party leaders in 
selecting candidates for election to the bench.323 Improvements in the nominating 
WL 6883292 (in Nevada, even a person who files a complaint against a judge is prohibited from disclosing 
this fact).
319 A point stressed in Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, 61 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 59 (1998).  See also Martin Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, 
and the Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 Southern California Law Review 673 (1999).
320 See, e.g., Frank Phillips, Judges Say Watchdog Tried to Foil an SJC Bid; Conduct Panel Sought 
Revenge, Jurists Say, Boston Globe, September 27, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6082569 (state judges 
charged that state judicial conduct commission attempted to sabotage a prominent judge’s candidacy for 
Supreme Judicial Court).
321 See Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, Law & Contemporary Problems 
59 (1998) (arguing that judicial independence is most gravely threatened when judges face sanctions based 
upon the merits of a ruling).
322 In California, for example, the state Commission on Judicial Performance filed charges 
(eventually dropped) against an appellate judge who announced in a dissent that as a matter of conscience 
he would refuse to follow a precedent of the state’s Supreme Court.  See Harriet Chiang, State Commission 
Drops Charges Against S.F. Judge/Rare Misconduct Allegation Over Judicial Opinion, San Francisco 
Chronicle, August 20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2693771.
323 New York again provides a lugubrious example of the extent of party leader influence in the 
judicial selection process.  See Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News,
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process, however, are unlikely to generate real results so long as the ultimate decision is 
left in the hands of the parties.  New York law requires that the parties nominate judges at 
conventions.324  The idea was that by opening the process to the public, nomination by 
backroom deal would be replaced with a more open and democratic system.  In practice, 
the nominating conventions are little more than travesties.  Bosses stack them with 
cronies whose sole responsibility is to rubber stamp the party’s choices.325  The delegates 
know nothing about the candidates and the convention itself takes less than an hour.
Another approach would be to prohibit political parties from publicly endorsing 
candidates for judicial elections.  Such prohibitions are unlikely to survive attack under 
the first amendment.326  Nonpartisan ballots, however, probably would survive 
constitutional scrutiny so long as political parties are not prohibited from supporting 
candidates outside the ballot.327  But removing party endorsements from the ballot is not 
necessarily a sensible idea.  Without party endorsement – however noisy that signal may 
be – many voters would be clueless as to the identities or qualifications of the candidates.  
People would vote on the basis of someone’s name, gender, or perceived ethnicity. 328
July 7, 2003 at 4 (judges in Queens County are personally selected by the Democratic Party leader).  The 
situation is the same or worse in Brooklyn, where judgeships are allegedly sold by party leaders for cash.  
See text accompanying notes ___, supra.  Gerald P. Garson, the judge indicted for accepting bribes to fix 
divorce cases, was a former treasurer of the Brooklyn Democratic organization. See Randal C. Archibold, 
Mayor Wants Panels to Name Some Judges Independently, New York Times, May 29, 2003, p B10.
324 See Clifford J. Levy, Picking Judges: Party Machines, Rubber Stamps, New York Times, July 20, 
2003, p. 1, 34.
325 See Clifford J. Levy, Picking Judges: Party Machines, Rubber Stamps, New York Times, July 20, 
2003, p. 1, 34.
326 See, e.g., Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993) (striking down state prohibition on party 
endorsements of candidates in nonpartisan elections).
327 Nonpartisan ballots for judicial elections have been used in some states.  See, e.g., Michael R. 
Dimino, Pay no Attention to that Man behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and 
Judges as Politicians, 21 Yale & Policy Review 301, 375 (2003).
328 To see the possibilities one need only look to the free-for-all that precipitated out of the successful 
candidate to schedule a recall election for California Governor Grey Davis in the summer of 2003.
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The party can at least be held accountable to some extent if the judges it recommends 
turn out to be stinkers.  
Campaign finance reform is also on the table in many states.  The idea here is that 
the imperative to raise campaign funds distracts judges from their proper tasks, opens 
them to influence, and damages public respect for the judiciary.329  Some states have 
imposed limits on contributions to judicial campaigns.330 Public financing for judicial 
elections might also address some of these concerns.331   But campaign finance reform is 
far from a panacea.  If voters are apathetic and uninformed, public funding will not 
address the underlying problem. Public funding is expensive, doesn’t eliminate 
unaffiliated expenditures, and doesn’t deal with incompetent, abusive or venal judges.  
Perhaps most importantly, it does not address the domination of the process by party 
leaders and could exacerbate the problem by increasing the pool of money which bosses
could siphon off for their own purposes.
Executive Appointment.  Executive appointment of judges is not a reform; it is the 
traditional means by which judges have been selected in the United States.  In light of the 
329 A survey conducted for the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas State Bar showed that nearly half 
of the judges in Texas and a large majority of lawyers and court employees believe that campaign 
contributions influence judicial decisions. See http://www.constitutionproject.org/ci/survey/texas.htm. An 
American Bar Association poll concluded that 72 percent of Americans nationwide are concerned that the 
impartiality of judges is compromised by their need to raise campaign contributions.  ABA Journal E-
report, August 16, 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/au16conf.html.
330 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-24-1; Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 253.155 (imposing restrictions on
contributions to judicial candidates or officeholders).
331 See Deborah Goldberg, Public Financing of Judicial Elections: the Roles of Judges and the Rules 
of Campaign Finance, 64 Ohio State Law Journal 95 (2003); Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About 
Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign Finance, 72 Southern California Law Review 505 (1999); 
Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 Loyola University of Los 
Angeles Law Review 1467, 1476-78 (2001); Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 
Loyola University of Los Angeles Law Review 1489, 1505 (2001).
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widespread adoption of judicial elections, however, executive appointment now has a 
place in the list of policy options along with other means for judicial selection.332
Executive appointment has the advantage that accountability for bad 
appointments can be tagged to the president or governor who selects the judge.  
Procedures for confirmation by a legislative body (in the case of the federal government, 
the Senate) provide an additional screen against bad quality.  
On the other hand, executive appointment has obvious problems.  Because judges 
typically serve for longer terms than the official who nominates them, the check of 
accountability is diluted by the fact that the nominating official will usually be out of 
office by the time a judge’s inadequacies come to light.  Unless the nominating official 
wants to create a legacy for her administration (a factor that may have some salience in 
the case of the federal judiciary), quality may be eclipsed by expediency.  
The process of legislative confirmation, while it may act as a partial check on 
quality, also introduces partisan considerations into the appointment process.  
Centralization of accountability is diluted when a nomination goes to a collective body.  
If the confirming body is dominated by a different political party than the nominating 
official, moreover, the confirmation process may be used as an opportunity to embarrass 
or punish a political adversary.  Interest groups can become active around high-profile 
appointments.333  If the nominating officer wants to avoid a bruising partisan battle, she 
may simply nominate a mediocre person with unimpeachable credentials and no “track 
332 See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection 
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 273, 309-10 (2002); J. David 
Rowe, Limited Term Merit Appointments: A Proposal to Reform Judicial Selection, 2 Texas Wesleyan 
Law Review 335 (1995).
333 It is probable, for example, that both liberal and conservative interest groups profited from the 
firestorm of controversy surrounding President Reagan’s nomination of Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
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record” of writings or speeches that might be taken out of context and used for political 
ammunition.  Finally, and perhaps most saliently, the executive appointment process 
appears most effective at weeding out unqualified candidates for appellate courts.  
Candidates for trial court judgeships do not receive the same attention.334  Thus, the 
appointment process may do little to police against bad judges at the trial level where the 
problem appears principally centered.
Merit Selection. Another approach is to replace political appointments (whether 
by election or executive nomination) with an ostensibly nonpolitical process in which 
judges are selected on the basis of merit.335 Merit selection of judges at the state level has 
been on the policy agenda for nearly a century, and began to be adopted beginning with 
Missouri in 1940.336 The Missouri Plan provides that the appointing authority (usually 
the governor) picks judges from a list of qualified candidates proposed by a selection 
committee.337   The selection committees are typically composed of attorneys, lay 
members, and judges.  Members of the selection committees are usually appointed by the 
334 At the federal level, for example, candidates for District Court positions are vetted for quality with 
the bar associations and other groups, but the selection process is essentially political. The tradition is that 
Senators in the President’s party pick candidates for district court vacancies in their districts.
335 For a recent endorsement of merit selection of state court judges, see Report of the Task Force on 
Selecting State Court Judges, in Task Forces of Citizens for Independent Courts, Uncertain Justice: Politics 
and America’s Courts 87-106 (2000).
336 See Maura Ann Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary: An 
Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 839 (1994); Jay A. Daugherty, The 
Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing 
Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 315, 318 (1997); Elmo B. Hunter, Revisiting the History and 
Success of Merit Selection in Missouri and Elsewhere, 60 University of Missouri at Kansas City Law 
Review 69 (1991).
337 See, e.g., http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jpr/Explanatory%20Documents/overview.htm (merit 
selection system for judges in Arizona).  Merit selection can also be introduced at the municipal or county 
level.  In New York City, for example, family court and criminal court judges are appointed by the mayor.  
By executive order, the mayor selects only people found to be “highly qualified” by a 19-member mayoral 
commission as well as by the city bar association. See Randal C. Archibold, Mayor Wants Panels to Name 
Some Judges Independently, New York Times, May 29, 2003, p B10.
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governor.338 Merit selection systems introduce electoral politics into the picture at the 
stage of retention.  Judges are re-evaluated by the commissions at this stage, and then run 
for retention in a public election.339  Thereafter, they serve for extended terms prior to 
another retention election.
Merit selection addresses several important problems.  Candidates for judicial 
office who lack basic knowledge of the law are unlikely to be appointed in merit 
selection states.  Similarly, individuals with reputations for being intemperate or abusive 
may be weeded out during the vetting process that accompanies merit selection.  Judicial 
candidates who have poor ethics might also be identified and excluded.  Most 
importantly, if a merit selection process works well, the influence of political insiders 
may be reduced.
Although it offers significant benefits over overtly political selection, merit 
selection is not a panacea for the bad judges problem.  Under existing merit selection 
programs, the vetting process takes place most intensively at the stage of initial 
appointment, where judicial candidates may be able to disguise their deficiencies.  Once 
appointed, they can manifest bad qualities with only minimal concern that they will be 
ousted.  Vetting of sitting judges tends to be less intensive than the initial investigation.  
The judge must run for retention, but the outcome is usually preordained because there is 
no opposing candidate.340  At this stage there is no rival who has a strong incentive to 
338 See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General 
Jurisdiction Courts (April 2002); The Counsel of State Governments, The Book of the States 137-39 (2000) 
(39 states select at least some of their judges by elections).
339 This is favored in Max Boot, Out of Order: Arrogance, Corruption and Incompetence on the 
Bench (1999).
340 Even in Illinois, a state where most judges are elected rather than appointed, retention elections are 
rarely contested.  See Marlene Arnold Nicholson and Norman Nicholson, Funding Judicial Campaigns in 
Illinois, 77 Judicature 294 (1994) (finding that losses in retention campaigns were quite unusual prior to 
1988 and remained uncommon thereafter).
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bring the candidate’s deficiencies to light, both because the public would probably not 
pay attention and because the rival would not necessarily be appointed if the judge lost 
her bid for retention. 
Although sometimes touted as a means for limiting the influence of interest 
groups in judicial elections,341 merit selection can be captured by special interests.342
Service on selection panels is a low visibility activity.  Interest groups can influence the 
appointing authority to pick their members for the selection committee.  The committee, 
in turn, may select judges not on intrinsic merit, but rather out of a wish to accommodate 
the demands of competing interests within its ranks.  Even if interest groups do not 
control appointments, moreover, the governor may select members of selection panels for 
political reasons.  The merit of judicial candidates is only as good as the quality of the 
persons serving on the selection committee.  Patronage and backroom deals are possible 
in merit selection systems.
Finally, merit selection sacrifices some degree of accountability.  If judges are 
selected by people who are not themselves accountable to the electorate, the democratic 
check on appointments is diluted.  Retention elections are not an effective bow to 
democratic principles given that they generate a vote in favor of retention in the vast 
majority of cases.  Perhaps because of their non-democratic features, merit selection 
plans encounter surprising public resistance.  Despite widespread perceptions that elected 
judges are less independent, judicial election of judges continues to be popular.343
341 See Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 Loyola University of Los
Angeles Law Review 1391 (2001).
342 See David Barnhizer, ‘On the Make’: Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American 
Judiciary, 50 Catholic Law Review 361, 423 (2001). 
343 See Ronald D. Rotunda, A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry into the Connection Between Judicial 
Decision Making and Campaign Contributions to Judicial Candidates, Professional Lawyer (Winter 2003).
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Publicity. Another possible systematic reform for dealing with bad judges is to 
increase public disclosure about judges.  Such disclosure could take a number of forms.
One option would be to disclose more information about disciplinary actions 
against judges.  Such information could be used in elections and could also provide a 
deterrent to judges who do not want their peccadilloes brought to light.  As noted above, 
however,344 increasing the information available about the activities of judicial 
disciplinary panels is a two-edged sword.  It would certainly increase public 
accountability and knowledge about judges.  On the other hand, the public may give too 
much weight to minor infractions, especially in systems with elected judges where 
opponents may attempt to take any sort of discipline out of context and turn it into a 
campaign issue.  If all disciplinary measures were publicized, the disciplinary panels 
would lose an important gradation in their ability to design punishments suitable for the 
offense.  Publicity may also increase the adversarialness of proceedings and may induce 
judges to be less cooperative with commi ttee investigations.  Further, if all sanctions for 
even minor offenses were reported, the public might overestimate the frequency and 
seriousness of judicial misconduct, eroding public respect for the law and the legal 
system.  Accordingly, while it makes sense to publish the names of judges who receive a 
serious sanction, there may be a sound rationale for maintaining the confidentiality of 
minor sanctions.
Another option for dealing with bad judges would be to publicize their 
administrative performance. In the federal system, for example, each judicial district 
must publish biannually a list of judges and the matters pending before them during a 
344 See text accompanying notes __ - __ supra.
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specified period of time.345  This requirement may shame some judges into speeding up 
their work.  But it is relatively minor punishment because few people other than fellow 
judges will care about the information.  Further, a judge’s backlog is not a reliable 
indication of quality.  A judge whose principal concern is to clear cases off her desk may 
have an excellent record for timeliness but still be a bad judge because she does not give 
sufficient attention to decisions.  Conversely a judge who has a longer- than-usual backlog 
may be someone who is scrupulous to make the right decision and to allow litigants full 
opportunities to present their cases.  Or the apparently dilatory judge may simply have 
large or complex cases on her docket.
A third option would be to provide general quality ratings of particular judges.  
Several states have instituted official systems of performance rating for judges.
Arizona’s is exemplary.  A 1992 amendment to the state constitution instructed the 
Supreme Court to institute a system for evaluating judicial performance and to report the 
results prior to a judge’s retention election.346 The Supreme Court appointed a 
Commission on Judicial Performance Review, composed of thirty individuals, the 
majority of whom may not be lawyers or judges.347 The commission evaluates whether 
judges meet performance standards related to legal ability, integrity, communication 
skills, judicial temperament, administrative performance, and settlement activities.  The 
commission investigates performance through surveys and other means of obtaining 
information from persons who have contact with judges, including litigants, witnesses, 
345 Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 476.   See R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting Under 
the Civil Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 687 (1993).
346 See Arizona Constitution, Article 6, § 42.
347 See http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jpr/Explanatory%20Documents/overview.htm.
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jurors, court staff, attorneys, and other judges.348  The results of these investigations are 
distributed to the public prior to each election in a voter information guide.  The 
commission also conducts mid-term self-evaluation reviews of judges who are not slated 
for retention elections; these are for the judge’s own use and are not made public.349  In 
both the retention and mid-term evaluations, the judges themselves fill out survey forms 
and meet with a delegation of the committee to develop self-improvement plans.
Information about judicial quality can also be obtained from private sources.  All 
judges have a reputation among lawyers and fellow judges that ranks them along 
dimensions such as skill, integrity, intelligence and fair-mindedness.  Newspapers and bar 
journals sometimes run stories in which quality of judges is assessed.  For judges who 
value their reputations as scholars or crusaders, law review commentary can be 
influential.  In some jurisdictions, trial lawyers give public ratings to judges.350
Public and private quality ratings offer some degree of help on the bad judges 
problem, but they suffer from several shortcomings.  Merely knowing that a particular 
judge has a reputation for quality (or lack of quality) provides little useful information to 
parties.  They still have to litigate their case.  Perhaps knowing that a judge has a bad 
temper might cause a lawyer to modulate the vehemence with which she objects to 
particular rulings, but overall, knowing that one is before a bad judge does little to cure 
the problem.  
Quality ratings do offer some value in the process of selection and retention, but 
even here their utility can be questioned.  In jurisdictions with elected judges, quality 
348 See http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jpr/Explanatory%20Documents/overview.htm.
349 See http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jpr/Explanatory%20Documents/overview.htm.
350 See, e.g., Robynn Tysver, Omaha Judge Reprimanded For Mistreating Defendants, Omaha World-
Herald, September 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4374792 (Nebraska). In New York, a publication called 
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ratings may have some effect in extreme cases, but even bad ratings are unlikely to 
prevent many judges from being elected.   Most voters care little about judicial 
elections,351 which typically offer the level of excitement of a PBS special on tooth 
decay.352  Voters are unlikely to pay attention to quality ratings unless the judge’s 
misconduct is salacious or extreme.  Even with the more permissive attitude recently 
displayed among the courts towards judicial campaign speech,353 it is unlikely that 
judicial elections will spark public interest.  Proposals for improving the quality of 
information available to the public thus run into the problem of voter apathy.
Quality ratings could have more of an influence in merit selection states, where 
judicial selection panels might find such information useful in selecting candidates.  The 
problem here is that if the candidate has not previously served as a judge, there will be no 
quality ratings available for that person.  When quality ratings are available, the judge is 
usually running in an unopposed retention election where the chance of ouster is low 
even if the judge turns out to be unqualified.
A final problem with quality ratings is that they depend on potentially biased or 
incomplete data.  Survey data, for example, can be instructive but must reflect a 
sufficiently large and unbiased sample of the population to convey reliable information.  
Much also depends on the questions asked.  Moreover, survey data is not bonded by 
“New York Judge Reviews” is available in which practicing lawyers critique judges before whom they 
appear. Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003, at 5.
351 See David Barnhizer, ‘On the Make’: Campaign Funding the Corrupting of the American 
Judiciary, 50 Catholic University Law Review 361, 364  (2001) (judicial elections typically spark little 
interest in the electorate).
352 See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, 
the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 Yale Law & Policy Review 301, 374 (2003) (judicial 
campaigns tend to be “docile” and “gentlemanly”); Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial 
Elections, 34 Loyola University of Los Angeles Law Review 1391, 1393 (2001) (judicial elections are 
“boring” and “minimally useful”).
353 See text accompanying notes ___ supra.  
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people’s actual behavior.  People only have to check boxes in a form.  Presumably, a
more reliable marker of quality would be people’s actual behavior with respect to a 
particular judge: do litigants seek to avoid a judge or rather affirmatively seek her out?  
Such information is not currently available in judicial quality surveys.
Educational Programs. Another approach to the bad judges problem would be a 
system of training for jurists.354 Educational programs may be particularly useful in the 
case of lower-level judicial officers such as magistrates or justices of the peace, who 
sometimes are not attorneys and may not even hold a college degree.355 There are, in 
fact, many programs available to judges offering continuing education in matters relevant 
to the judicial function.  These include programs offered by the Federal Bar Association, 
the American Bar Association, universities,356 think tanks and private entities with a wide 
range of views and ideologies.357
However, educational programs for judges provide at most a partial fix for the bad 
judges problem.  There is usually no requirement that judges undergo any educational 
preparation for their elevation to the bench.358  Unlike certain foreign countries, in which 
354 See Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 Fordham Urban Law Journal 851 (2002) 
(recommending required educational credentialing for judges).
355 See Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law, Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 12685479 (Arizona magistrates and municipal judges need only a high school 
diploma).
356 The Institute for Judicial Administration at my own institution, New York University Law School, 
is a leading example.
357 See Thomas M. Nickel, Judges Deserve Access to Educational Opportunities, 49 Federal Lawyer 
56, 57-58 (2002) (cataloging educational opportunities for judges).  Some, notably former judge Abner 
Mikva, complain that these seminars are a plot by conservatives to lure judges into indoctrination sessions 
at luxurious boondoggles.  See Abner Mikva, Judges, Junkets, and Seminars, Litigation, Summer 2002 
(complaining that “private interests” are “allowed to wine and dine judges at fancy resorts under the pretext 
of ‘educating’ them”).  Senators Feingold and Kerry introduced legislation in 2000 that would have reined
in such activities.  See Judicial Education Reform Act of 2000, S. 2990 (106th Cong.) (Kerry-Feingold 
bill).  For discussion of the overall issue, see Bruce Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded 
Educational Programs? Should Judicial Education be Privatized?: Questions Of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 
29 Fordham Urban Law Journal 941 (2002).
358 See Marc T. Amy, Judiciary School: A Proposal For a Pre-Judicial LLM Degree, 52 Journal of
Legal Education 130 (2002) (calling for formal educational requirements for judges).
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service on the judiciary is viewed as a career path involving extensive educational 
preparation and possibly an internship with a judge,359 American judges face only 
minimal prerequisites for service.  Judges are encouraged or required to enroll in
continuing education courses,360 but the requirements tend to be light and can be satisfied 
by a wide range of seminars of the judge’s choosing.  Most judges obtain their continuing 
education on the bench.  Ironically, the judges who voluntarily sign up for seminars are 
likely to be the ones who need them the least: only judges who are intellectually inclined 
are likely to consider it a pleasure to spend a week mooting legal doctrines with 
professors.  Judges who truly need the educational booster shot will not get it.
Most fundamentally, education alone cannot solve many of the problems of bad 
judges.  Even brilliant judges behave badly.  Consider former New York State Chief 
Justice Sol Wachtler, widely viewed as an outstanding intellect and a superbly qualified 
jurist.361  Few judges were less in need of continuing education than Judge Wachtler.  Yet 
when a romance with a New York socialite went awry, Wachtler commenced a disastrous 
359 In France, for example, judges are selected by a competitive examination, attend a specialized 
school, and serve as the equivalent of government civil service officers. See John Bell, Principles and 
Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 Southern California Law Review 1757, 1758 (1988). In 
Germany, prospective judges must pass two rigorous examinations and must serve a practicum with a 
judge. See David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation 
of a Rechtsstaat, 61 Southern California Law Review 1795, 1802- 04 (1988).  Similarly, in Japan, 
prospective judges must graduate from a law department of a University, pass a national examination, serve 
two years of training at a national institute, and then serve as an assistant judge before being promoted as a 
judge with a full ten-year term.  See Takaaki Hattori, The Role of the Supreme Court of Japan in the Field 
of Judicial Administration, 60 Washington Law Review 69, 72-81 (1984).
360 In some states, continuing education for judges is only recommended.  See, e.g., California State 
Rules of Judicial Administration, Appellate Division I, Standard 25.1(a) (“Judicial officers should consider 
participation in judicial education activities to be an official judicial duty. The responsibility for planning, 
conducting, and overseeing judicial education properly rests in the judiciary.”).  Other states require it, 
either for non-attorney judges, see, e.g., Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar & Discipline of Attorneys, 
Rule 29 (requiring CLE for city and town judges who are not licensed as attorneys), or for judges generally, 
see, e.g., Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 260.2 (requiring all state judges to complete 45 units of CLE 
during each three-year period).
361 See generally, Linda Wolfe, Double Life: The Shattering Affair Between Chief Judge Sol 
Wachtler and Socialite Joy Silverman (1997); Laurie Goodstein, Trail of N.Y. Socialite’s Tormentor Led 
Tragically Close to Home, Washington Post, November 15, 1992.
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course of conduct including extortion, stalking, and kidnapping threats – resulting in a 
fall from grace worthy of a Shakespearian tragedy.  While intensive psychotherapy might 
have prevented Wachtler’s collapse, no amount of continuing judicial education would 
have done the job.
C.  Remedies Relying on Private Action
Forum Selection.  We turn now to remedies relying on private action.  One 
obvious avenue available to litigants is the option to avoid an undesirable jurist by choice 
of forum.  A plaintiff can generally bring suit in the court of her choice so long as 
requirements of personal jurisdiction and venue are satisfied.  Thus, if a plaintiff fears 
encountering a bad judge in one forum, she can usually go elsewhere.  Defendants have 
fewer options, but even they can exercise a substantial degree of forum choice.  If they do 
not like a particular judge, they can move to transfer the case because of lack of venue or 
on grounds of forum non conveniens.  If the suit is brought in state court, the defendant 
may be able to remove it to federal court.  Defendants may even enjoy one advantage as 
compared with plaintiffs, in that they will often know the identity of the judge assigned to 
their case at the time they face the decision about whether to seek a change of forum.
Forum choice is not a satisfactory answer to the problem of bad judges, however.  
To avoid a particular judge, a plaintiff may have to abandon an entire jurisdiction in 
which many highly qualified judges also serve.  Forum choice can also be costly since the 
parties may wind up litigating in an inconvenient court.  The grounds for forum choice, 
moreover, are only accidentally correlated with the quality of the judge.  Removal is
solely jurisdictional: it  will not lie to correct even overt bias or prejudice on the part of 
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the state judge if grounds for removal are not otherwise present.362  Moreover, the power 
of forum choice may exacerbate rather than ameliorate the bad judges problem.  Suppose 
that a plaintiff’s attorney happens to have an inappropriately close relationship with the 
only judge in a particular court.  The plaintiff can then use the power of forum choice to 
select a judge biased in her favor.  Here, forum selection makes matters worse.
Peremptory Challenges. Several states allow litigants to peremptorily challenge 
judges.363 In some, the challenge must be accompanied by a lawyer’s affidavit asserting 
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained.364  Other states do not require an
allegation of cause.365 In all states with peremptory judicial challenges, pleadings and 
motions facially conforming to the requirements of the rules are sufficient to require 
immediate replacement of the judge for all future merit-based adjudications,366 at least so 
long as a party opposing the challenge cannot establish that it is made in bad faith or for 
purposes of delay.367
362 See, e.g., Kennedy v. State, 373 F.Supp. 519 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (remanding case which had been 
removed from state court by a criminal defendant who claimed that the state trial judge was racially 
prejudiced and biased in favor of the prosecution).
363 Alaska Statutes § 22.20.022, Alaska R.Civ. P. 42(c); Alaska R. Crim. P. 25(d); Arizona.R. Civ. P. 
42(f); Ariz.R. Crim. P. 10.2; California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6; Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 
51.05; Mont. Sup. Ct. R. 34; New Mexico R.Civ. Pro. 1-088.1; New Mexico R. Crim. Pro. 5-106; Nevada 
Sup. Ct. R. 48.1; Oregon Statutes § 14.260; Wisconsin Statutes Ann. § 971.20 (applying to criminal cases 
only); Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 40.1(b).  Some states permit peremptory challenges to judges 
designated by special appointment, such as visiting judges, but do not extend the privilege to the trial courts 
generally.  See, e.g., Texas Government Code § 74.053.  Peremptory challenge procedures have been 
proposed for the federal courts, but have never been adopted.  See S. 1886, 92nd Cong. 1st. Sess. § 3 (1971).
364 See, e.g., Alaska Statutes § 22.20.02.  The affidavit requirement was a response to constitutional 
objections to peremptory judicial challenges based on state separation of powers principles.  See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Goldman, 94 Nev. 6, 575 P.2d 929, 930 (1978) (striking down Nevada’s peremptory challenge 
statute on state separation of powers grounds).
365 See, e.g., Wisconsin Statutes Ann. § 971.20; Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 51.05; New Mexico 
R.Civ. Pro. 1-088.1.  These procedures may be upheld against constitutional challenge, either because they 
are found not to intrude on the judicial province, see State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 3154 N.W.2d 703 
(1982), or because they are adopted by the judicial branch itself – as in the case of procedures embodied in 
rules of court.  
366 See, e.g., State ex rel. Walters v. Schaeperkoetter, 22 S.W.3d 740 (Mo. App. 2000) (upon proper 
filing of challenge, judge’s only remaining jurisdiction was to grant the application and transfer the case).
367 See, e.g., Oregon Rev. Stat. § 14.260 (peremptory challenge of judge must be allowed unless “the 
judge moved against, or the presiding judge in those counties where there is one, challenges the good faith 
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Peremptory judicial challenges balance fairness to the parties against interests in 
preserving judicial efficiency and preventing “judge-shopping.”  The latter two concerns 
dictate that, in general, each party gets only one challenge – otherwise parties could 
continuously challenge judges, thus imposing costs on their adversaries and the judicial 
system and preventing adjudications on the merits.368 For similar reasons, peremptory 
judicial challenges must be made within a relatively short time after the identity of the 
judge is known to the party making the challenge.369
Problems can arise when multiple parties are involved.  In such cases, the 
peremptory challenge rule needs to be administered with sensitivity to fairness to the 
parties while at the same time avoiding the inefficiencies and potential strategic 
advantages that could be created if multiple parties on the same side were allowed to 
exercise separate challenges.  Courts generally address the problem of multiple parties by 
allowing parties who are aligned in interest only one peremptory challenge between 
them,370 or giving judges discretion to determine a fair number of challenges when the 
parties cannot agree.371  Other problems arise when parties who would be entitled to 
of the affiant and sets forth the basis of such challenge. . . . The burden of proof shall be on the challenging 
judge to establish that the motion was made in bad faith or for the purposes of delay.”)
368 The rule providing a party with one and only one peremptory challenge may be tested when the 
court has to decide whether a given proceeding is the same or different from an earlier proceeding in which 
a challenge was exercised. See Staso v. State Department of Transportation , 895 P.2d 988 (Alaska 1995) 
(allowing party to exercise second peremptory challenge of judge after dismissal of earlier identical case, 
but noting that courts can impose sanctions on parties for bad-faith dismissals); Crain v. Missouri Pacific 
R.R. 640 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. App.1982) (allowing second peremptory challenge even though challenge had 
already been exercised in a case between the same parties and matter had same caption and case number, 
because court held that the second controversy was an independent civil action).
369 If, however, a party has succeeded in obtaining a reversal of a trial court’s ruling, some states 
provide for second peremptory challenge on remand, perhaps out of concern that the trial judge not be 
permitted to penalize the winning party for taking the appeal. See, e.g., Wisconsin Statutes Ann. § 
971.20(7).  
370 Missouri’s rule, for example, allows only one peremptory challenge to five categories of litigants, 
regardless of how many parties may be in each category: plaintiffs, defendants, third party plaintiffs, third 
party defendants, and intervenors.  Mo. R.C.P. 51.05(d).
371 See, e.g., Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d): “When multiple defendants are unable to agree upon the 
judge to hear the case, the trial judge may, in the interest of justice, give them more than one change as a 
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peremptory challenges are added late in the litigation; here the courts generally allow the 
challenges to go forward.372
Peremptory challenges of judges are a constructive reform with considerable 
efficacy as a means for excluding a judge while alleviating some of the onus associated 
with having to allege that a judge is unable to provide a fair trial.373 All states should 
give serious consideration to the procedure.  However, as currently structured, 
peremptory challenge procedures do not go far enough.
For one thing, peremptory challenges are allowed only after a judge has been 
assigned to the case.  Because of this fact, the judge will know that she has been 
challenged as biased, and also will know the identity of the lawyer making the charge.  
Indeed, the peremptory challenge must be directed to the very judge whose integrity is 
being questioned.  This process places the trial judge in the unsatisfactory position of 
being confronted with a serious accusation going to her fitness to serve without the least 
opportunity to defend herself.  While it may be argued that the judge does not need to 
defend herself since the challenge must be granted as a matter of right, it would be 
natural for a judge to feel insulted and frustrated at being required to grant relief to a 
party who has made what the judge considers to be an unwarranted slight to her integrity.  
Related to this concern is the fact that the judge will know the identity of the challenger.  
Some states provide that a party exercising the right to a peremptory challenge cannot be 
matter of right; the prosecutor shall be entitled to the same number of changes as all the defendants 
combined.”
372 See Home Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 (Cal. App. 2002), review 
granted (allowing the challenges to go forward even if the party making the challenge is joined at a late 
stage in the action); Stephens v. Superior Court, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 616 (Cal. App. 2002) (late-joined party 
may exercise a peremptory challenge up to the point at which the trial has commenced or the judge has 
decided a contested issue of fact).
373 Robert A.  Levinson, Peremptory Challenges of Judges in the Alaska Courts, 6 Alaska Law 
Review 269, 272-73 (1977).
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punished by contempt for doing so, or that if a judge’s ruling is reversed on appeal, the 
appellant has the right to challenge the trial judge on remand.374  But these rules do not 
address the problem of retribution against attorneys.  While litigants may never appear in 
the judge’s courtroom again, the lawyer probably will, and judges have long memories.  
The judge might bide her time and then take out her frustration on an attorney in another 
case.  And it is, of course, exactly the bad judges who are most likely to exact this kind of 
payback.  Attorneys, knowing this risk, may be less inclined to exercise their client’s 
peremptory challenge in order to stay on good terms with the judge.
Peremptory challenges of judges create particular difficulties in states that require 
the attorney to make a sworn allegation that the judge cannot provide a fair trial.  This
requirement exacerbates the problem of insult to the judge and potential retribution 
against the attorney.  Beyond this, the obligation to make an allegation under oath creates
tensions with the attorney’s role as advocate for the client.  Suppose that a plaintiff’s 
attorney considers the judge to be incompetent but not unfair.  In light of the complexity 
of the issues, the attorney believes that the judge is unlikely to understand the theory of 
the case.  The client would be much better off with a different judge.  Or suppose the 
attorney believes that the judge has strong ideological views unfavorable to the client’s 
case, such that the judge is likely, given a matter of first impression, to rule for the 
adversary.  On the other hand, the attorney also believes that the judge is willing to apply 
the law to the facts once the law has been decided.  Can the attorney make the required 
attestation in these cases?  Presumably not because the attorney does not have adequate 
grounds to believe the judge is incapable of providing a fair trial.  But the attorney’s duty 
374 See text accompanying notes __ - __ supra.
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of vigorous advocacy on behalf of the client, coupled with the fact that the veracity of the 
attorney’s affidavit cannot be questioned, might encourage the attorney to do so.
  Finally, data on peremptory challenges of judges have not been used to aid in 
retention, supervision or re-election. The frequency of peremptory challenges would 
appear to provide useful information about a judge’s reputation for fair-mindedness and 
integrity.  However, these statistics do not appear to be maintained or distributed.   
III.  The Panel Exclusion Approach
Having surveyed the landscape of existing approaches to the bad judges problem, 
we can now assess the panel exclusion idea.  This idea has two parts.  First, the court 
administrator would select at random panels of three or five trial judges for any given 
case.  The names of these judges would be given to the parties but the judges themselves 
would be shielded from knowledge that they are on any particular panel.  Each party 
would then have the unqualified right at the outset of a case to exclude one judge (in the 
case of a three judge panel) or two judges (in the case of a five judge panel).  Exercises of 
this exclusion right would be kept confidential and not shared either with the opposing
party or with the judges on the panels.  After the parties have exercised their exclusion 
rights (or refrained from exercising them), the court administrator would select a trial 
judge from those remaining on the panel.  As the idea is constructed, there would never 
be fewer than one judge remaining on the panel even if all exclusion rights were 
exercised.  The trial judge who is selected would then handle the litigation in the ordinary 
course.375
375 This idea is similar to procedures common used to select labor arbitrators.  See, e.g., American 
Arbitration Association, Labor Arbitration Rule 12, available at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\National_I
nternational\..\..\focusArea\labor\laborarbrules.html#12 (providing that if the parties have not designated a 
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The panel exclusion idea would need to be implemented in such a way as to 
account for several of the issues that have arisen in connection with peremptory 
challenges of judges.  For example, it would be necessary for exclusion rights to be 
exercised by a specified time early in the proceeding.  Unlike the peremptory challenge 
model, the early exercise of exclusion rights would tend to be self-regulating in the panel 
exclusion idea since the case cannot progress unless a judge has been assigned, and the 
judge would not be assigned until the parties had exercised their exclusions.  The system 
would also have to account for issues of multiple parties.  When only a plaintiff and a 
defendant are involved, its administration would be straightforward, but when third party 
defendants, intervening plaintiffs, or additional defendants with conflicting interests are 
joined, the matter becomes more complicated.  However, these issues have been handled 
satisfactorily in states with peremptory judicial challenges, and there is no reason they 
could not also be dealt with efficiently under the panel exclusion idea.  
The second part of the panel exclusion idea is that the court administrator would 
compile information about exclusion rates and make this information public in 
connection with selection, retention, or removal. The idea here is that the decision to 
exclude a judge will be made (in the usual case) by attorneys who have good information 
about the quality of the judges under consideration.  Because attorneys are repeat players 
in jurisdictions in which they practice, they will often have personal experience with the 
judges selected for the panel, and thus have a good basis on which to make the exclusion 
method for selecting arbitrators, the arbitration association provides a list of potential arbitrators to the 
parties, who thereafter have the right to strike names of persons they do not want to hear the case); Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service Rule 1404.12(c)(1), available at 
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=197&itemID=16959 (providing that where 
collective bargaining agreement is silent on method of selecting arbitrators, arbitrator may be selected from 
panel by each party striking a name until one remains). 
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decision.  Even if an attorney has slight or no personal experience with a judge, she will 
often have partners or associates who have experience with the judge.  And attorneys 
have opportunities to obtain information about judges through informal contacts with 
other attorneys.  Moreover, the panel exclusion idea, if implemented, would provide 
additional incentives for attorneys to become informed about judges because they will 
know that they are likely to be faced with exclusion decisions in the future.  Because the 
exclusion decision is likely to be made by a well-informed party, it provides potentially 
reliable information about the quality of the judges under consideration.  The quality of 
the information would be further enhanced by the compilation of numerous exclusion 
decisions into an overall statistic that would tend to correct for mistakes in individual 
cases.
Exclusion rates could be used in a number of different ways.  For example, if 
judges are slated for retention elections under a merit selection process, the exclusion 
rates of the candidates could be distributed to the public along with some key for 
evaluating a candidate’s performance relative to her colleagues.  The same could be done 
if a judge runs for re-election.  One might imagine an even more potent use of these 
statistics: a jurisdiction could provide that a judge would be disqualified from running for 
re-election or retention if her exclusion rates exceeded some high threshold. Data on 
exclusion rates could be useful even if a judge does not stand for election.  High rates of 
exclusion provide feedback to a judge, or to persons charged with supervising the judge, 
that there is something amiss in her conduct.  Even in the federal system with life tenure 
for judges, exclusion rates could be helpful at identifying problems and providing judges 
with an incentive to correct their deficiencies.  These data could also be useful in the case 
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of promotions in the federal system: if a district court judge is a candidate for nomination 
to an appellate position, his or her record of exclusion would presumably be something 
that the president and the senate would take into account.
The panel exclusion idea would address most of the problems with bad judges 
identified earlier in this paper. Judges who are corrupt, venal, biased, incompetent, 
neglectful, whimsical, partisan, arbitrary, abusive, or conflicted would face exclusion 
under this reform.  The panel exclusion concept would cover a wider range of misconduct 
than even the peremptory challenge procedure, which is (in theory) limited to cases in 
which the judge’s bias renders her unlikely to provide a fair and impartial forum.376
Indeed, the idea would cover judicial qualities which do not fall into any category of 
misconduct.  Parties would have the opportunity to select for desirable qualities such as 
excellence in legal analysis or superior judicial temperament.
The panel exclusion idea offers other benefits.  Because judges would not be 
aware that they are assigned to panels and because exclusions would be implemented by 
court administrators, judges would not face the unsatisfactory necessity, which they 
experience in peremptory challenge jurisdictions, of having to approve a motion that is 
based on an insult to their very fitness for office.  For the same reason, lawyers and 
litigants who exercise their exclusion rights have no reason to fear retribution from the 
judge.  Judges would not know the identities of people who excluded them.  Even if a
judge found out, she would not have a good reason to take offense.  Because exclusion 
decisions could be made for any reason or no reason at all, there would be no insult to the 
judge from the fact of being excluded.  Indeed, parties would often exercise their 
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exclusion rights for the same reason that parties exercise peremptory challenges to jurors
in criminal trials: if there is even a slight reason to prefer one judge over another, the 
party would have an incentive to exclude the less preferred judge.  Being excluded in a 
given case would not necessarily represent a negative assessment about the judge’s 
fitness for office.
The panel exclusion idea would appear to represent a constructive approach to the
tension between accountability, independence and quality in the selection and supervision 
of American judges.  Decisions by private litigants to exclude judges from panels do not 
threaten the autonomy or integrity of the judicial branch.  At the same time, the panel 
selection idea creates significant opportunities for holding judges accountable to the very 
parties – litigants and lawyers – who have the most at stake.  Judges who do not act in 
ways that are acceptable to these constituents will be excluded.  The accountability 
achieved by the panel exclusion idea would be particularly valuable in jurisdictions with 
appointed judges, since it would permit litigants to vote with their feet.  The idea also 
mitigates the potential adverse effects of achieving accountability through electoral 
selection of judges.  The “majoritarian difficulty”377 of elected judges is controlled, to 
some extent, if litigants have the right to exclude judges whose integrity may be 
compromised by political obligations.
The panel selection idea would not increase public suspicion of judges or 
undermine the rule of law.  It is true that exclusion rates would be made public, or at least 
made available to persons with authority for selecting candidates for retention or re-
376 The panel exclusion process would not, however, deal with all cases of bad judges: personal 
misconduct outside the bench, for example, might not be regulated even when the judge’s peccadilloes 
reflect adversely on her fitness for office.
70
election.  The public would have access to information that judges were excluded from 
sitting on cases.  This information, however, would not necessarily evoke concern.  If the 
public understood that exclusions could be made for any reason or no reason at all, they 
would see that even a relatively high exclusion rate would not impeach the judiciary’s 
competence or integrity.  At the same time, public trust in the judiciary and the rule of 
law would likely be increased to the extent that people perceived that they have the 
power to reject trial judges whose integrity or impartiality they distrust.  Moreover, if the 
panel exclusion idea is effective, the result would be to weed out bad judges, eventually 
enhancing judicial quality and, concomitantly , increasing public respect for the judiciary 
and the rule of law.
The panel exclusion idea would take some of the pressure off other methods for 
controlling bad judges.  For example, if a party distrusts the fairness of a trial judge, she 
could simply exclude the judge from the panel.  It would not be necessary for the party 
move to recuse the judge, which as already noted is both risky for the moving party and 
potentially damaging to the reputation of the judiciary.378  Similarly, panel exclusions 
would take some of the pressure off judicial disciplinary commissions: many potential 
instances of judicial misconduct could be averted by exclusion, and the process of 
exclusion itself together with publication of exclusion rates could deter misconduct which 
would otherwise fall within the responsibility of these commissions.  
The panel exclusion idea would appear relatively easy to implement.  It would be 
necessary for the court administrator to come up with the requisite number of judges for 
377 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 
University of Chicago Law Review 689 (1995).
378 Recusal should still be available, however, if the judge selected after the panel exclusion process 
turns out to be biased or prejudiced.
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the panels – a requirement that might pose problems in states with rural populations.  
Judges might be required to hear cases as visitors in other courtrooms.  The experience of 
California and other states using peremptory challenges of judges, however, indicates that 
this staffing problem would not be overwhelming.  In other respects the panel exclusion 
idea appears more efficient than many other approaches for controlling bad judges.  
Parties would not be required to seek out inconvenient forums.  Protracted and costly 
hearings would not be needed to establish whether or not the judge was biased or 
otherwise engaged in misconduct.  The panel exclusion idea even offers cost advantages 
as compared with peremptory challenges of judges, which is in itself an inexpensive 
procedure: because judges would be excluded at the very outset, judges would not have 
the opportunity to issue even preliminary rulings before being excluded (other than on 
emergency motions such as temporary restraining orders). The chief judge or court 
administrator would not have to make seriatim appointments, and there would be no 
grounds for objection to exclusion on the ground that it was made in bad faith or for 
purposes of delay.
In objection to the panel exclusion idea, it could be argued that challenges to 
judges should only be used to protect against the danger of biased tribunals, and should 
not be employed as a means “to obtain strategic advantage by forum shopping for an 
ideal judge.”379  But the idea would not involve “judge-shopping.”  It may be 
inappropriate for parties to take strategic advantage of a procedure devised for other 
reasons in order to obtain a benefit unanticipated by the framers of the procedure in 
question.  This is not the panel exclusion idea, which is specifically designed to allow 
379 Moore v. State, 895 P.2d 507 (Alaska App. 1995). 
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parties to exercise exclusion rights for any reason or no reason at all.  Excluding judges 
under this process is no more “judge shopping” than exercising peremptory challenges of 
jurors is “jury shopping.”  It is true, of course, that the essence of the idea is to allow 
parties some say in the selection of the judges who will hear their cases; but to denigrate 
this as “judge shopping” is to substitute invective for analysis.
Another objection to the panel exclusion idea is that its effect would be to create a 
regression of judges towards a neutral but unimaginative mean.  Crusading or creative 
judges might not be selected.  It might be argued that innovative or opinionated judges 
add a desirable leaven to the flatbread of ordinary law, or that even if their creativity is 
problematic, their brilliance and energy more than compensate  for their shortcomings.  
However, the panel exclusion idea would not rule out brilliant or imaginative jurists.  
Complex cases often demand untried approaches; and it is frequently in the interests of 
all parties that the judge keep an open mind as to how a case might be litigated or a 
remedy devised.  As to a crusading interest in a particular matter, the answer is that such 
judges are not good judges if they allow personal views to infect decisions, even if we 
agree with their philosophy on the merits.  At least at the trial level, the judge ought to 
oversee a process in which the facts are found in an impartial and fair manner and the law 
is applied as set forth by the legislature or interpreted by the courts.  The panel exclusion 
idea would tend to select for this kind of judge.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the problem of bad judges in America’s courts.  The 
article identified types of judicial misconduct and provided examples of each.  It
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examined existing approaches to the issue, each of which in different ways seeks to 
balance the values of independence, accountability and quality.  
The paper then proposed a new approach.  Under the panel exclusion idea, the 
court administrator would randomly select a panel of judges and present the names to the 
litigants.  The litigants would be allowed to exclude judges in such a way that at least one 
judge would be left at the end of the process.  Parties would not be required to provide 
any reason for striking a potential judge, and judges would not know they have been 
excluded.  Exclusion rates would be complied and used in the process of retention, re-
election and supervision.  The article argued that the panel exclusion idea has merit when 
combined with existing approaches and that it offers advantages over currently available 
options.
